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PLO'S AL-SARTAWI DISCUSSES ISRAELI LABOR PROGRAM

LD270927 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 24 Jan 81 p 1

["Correspondent" report: "PLO Exposes Dangers of Israeli Labor Party Program"]

[Text] London--Dr 'Isam al-Sartawi, member of the Palestine National Council [PNC] and a leading member of the Fatah movement, said that the political program adopted by the Israeli Labor Party at its third congress "is a program of war and annihilation and not a peace program."

Speaking at a press conference at the PLO office in London, Dr Al-Sartawi said that the Labor Party's program is based on four no's: no to the PLO, no to Palestinian self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state, no withdrawal from Jerusalem and no return to the 4 June 1967 borders.

Dr Al-Sartawi, who is currently touring Europe at the same time as Israeli Labor Party leader Shim'on Peres is making a similar tour, said: "Peres is trying to deceive and mislead the Western world with the Israeli Labor Party's program, which is no more than an expansionist program based on the policy of annihilating the Palestinian people, a policy which is couched in false and misleading terms."

Discussing the Labor Party's program article by article, Dr Al-Sartawi demonstrated that the real context of the program is the desire for expansion and not for the achievement of peace and security. He said that Article 6 of the program, for example, says that the Israeli Government under the Labor Party would be prepared to negotiate with its neighbors without preconditions on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. He then wondered: "Since Israel wants to annex the occupied Golan Heights, which is a fact, on what condition will it then negotiate with Syria?"

Asked whether he prefers the clarify of the Likud government's stand to the Labor Party's prevarications, he said: "I refuse to choose between dying by drowning or dying by strangulation. Begin is an enemy who has openly declared his intentions and encouraged among other things the extremist Gush Emunim settlers, but the Labor Party program is characterized by prevarications and deceit. The danger lies in the fact that it wants to

evict the Palestinians from their lands. We must not forget that Gush Emunim movement came into being during the previous Israeli labor government, and Peres himself was one of its greatest supporters. In fact he was one of the greatest enthusiasts for Jewish settlement in heavily populated Arab areas."

Dr Al-Sartawi declined to disclose how the PLO was able to obtain the Hebrew and English versions of the Israeli Labor Party's political program, but said: "During the recent socialist international conference in Madrid the Israeli Labor Party was able to deceive and mislead the conference. The Israeli Labor Party published the text of the political program in the (rightist) newspaper YEDI'OT AHARONOT on 13 November, the same day the Madrid conference was opened. The conference was unable to obtain an immediate translation of the Hebrew version into the required languages. The timing of the release of the program was deliberate, and Peres was able to mislead the conference delegates. As a result the delegates came out with the resolution saying that the Israeli labor alignment "represents the best hope for peace in and peace with Israel."

Dr Al-Sartawi pointed out that the Labor Party program contains clear criticism of the Likud government because it surrendered the airfields and the Jewish settlements in Sinai as well as the Egyptian oilfields.

Dr Al-Sartawi said that the Labor Party's political program is full of threats to the Arabs in general and the Palestinian people in particular and leaves no room for a real and just peace that would meet any of the Palestinian people's legal or just demands. Dr Al-Sartawi urged the Western world to beware of the dangers of the Israeli Labor Party's program, saying that it must be understood and exposed before it is too late, because the program means further annihilation of the Palestinian people and further threat to world peace, which also means a threat to Western interests in the Middle East.

CSO: 4802

IRAN, IRAQ CLAIM SUCCESSES IN WAR

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 14 Jan 81 p 3

[Text]

Beirut, Jan. 13

IRAN said yesterday its forces had shot down an Iraqi MiG fighter in its counter-offensive in the Gulf war, while Iraq backed its claims of a major victory by putting more than 30 captured tanks on display.

Each side reported victories and casualties on the other side, in the war that began last September.

In Teheran, the official Pars news agency quoted an Armed Forces communique as saying the MiG was shot down this afternoon and that six others were detected by radar and forced to flee.

Iran also said its troops had killed or wounded 30 Iraqis, destroyed three tanks and captured three tanks.

In Iraq, foreign journalists were shown the U.S. and British-built tanks captured from Iran.

They also saw at a military camp near Basra 20 more captured M-60 and Chieftain tanks being taken from the battlefront on military transporters.

Iran launched its counter-offensive a week ago and both sides have reported fierce ground and air battles.

«Glorious victories»

Teheran Radio quoted Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Rajai as saying on an Arabic service programme today: «We have achieved glorious victories. We have got back major parts of our lands occupied by (Iraqi President) Saddam (Hussein).

«We hope to bury Saddam... in southern areas», he said, apparently referring to Iran's southern Khuzestan province where much of the fighting has taken place in the Gulf war.

Mr Rajai said Iran would continue the war until «final victory over the leader of the atheists».

Pars quoted an unnamed parliamentary deputy for western Ilam province as saying Iranian forces penetrated several miles into Iraqi territory in pursuit of Iraqi forces, and that 15 Iranians were killed and 30 wounded in the Ilam sector in the last few days.

The Red Crescent Society, Iran's equivalent of the Red Cross, reported one of its people killed while carrying wounded soldiers on the battlefield, the eighth Red Crescent member to die on the front, Pars said.

Military trap

In Iran, foreign journalists were told by a Brigadier the main thrust of the Iranian counter-offensive ran into a classic military trap south of the west Iran city of Susangerd.

He said two armoured brigades, composed of about 200 tanks, were captured or destroyed in a four-day battle south-east of Susangerd.

The Brigadier said another Brigade was forced to retreat towards Ahwaz, the capital of Khuzestan.

He said the three Brigades constituted the 16th Iranian Army Division. According to the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran had three Armoured Divisions at the start of the war.

In one day, one Brigade of 112 tanks was knocked out and on two others last week a total of 102 more were captured or destroyed, the Brigadier said.

He described as stupid Iran's offensive in the present wet and muddy contitions in south-west Iran.

Killing zone

He said Iranian armour had been lured into what he called a «killing zone» between two branches of the Karkheh river and had then been pounded with anti-tank rockets and artillery.

A killing zone is a pre-arranged target area on which artilery previously has been trained.

Most of the tanks on display were in good condition and only a few were blackened from shell fire, indicating that many Iranian crews had surrendered. Some had left behind their helmets.

The Brigadier said that the British-built Chieftain tank, captured in fairly large numbers, was good.

«It has no real weakness. It just has bad drivers».

He added jokingly: «Perhaps we will form a Chieftain Brigades.

CSO: 4920

FACILITIES FOR TESTING SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT COMPLETED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Dec p 5

[Article by Amos Hadad: "Aircraft Industries Completed Triple-sonic Air Tunnel"]

[Text] A new triple-sonic air tunnel, used for developing future aircraft, was completed recently by the engineering department of the Aircraft Industries, and is bineg tested.

The new air tunnel will be used for aerodynamic tests of reduced size models of aircraft in sub-sonic, hypersonic, and supersonic categories from 0.5 mach to 5.0 mach. Aircrafts Industries considers the completion of the wind tunnel as a vital and important step in aircraft development. The new tunnel is equipped with two changeable testing compartments. One is used for sub-sonic and hypersonic speeds (up to 1.4 mach), and the other for supersonic experiments (1.4 to 5.0 mach). Each compartment is cross section 1.2 by 1.2 meter and 1.5 meter long.

The tunnel works on the principle of blowing in a high pressure air jet and letting it out of the compartment. The air is produced by compressors, activated by a powerful electric motor and stored in six giant tanks outside the tunnel. The volume of compressed air in the tanks permits conducting experiments from 15 to 110 seconds.

The reduced size model of the tested aircraft, made of metal with high precision, is connected inside the tunnel to a scale which measures electrically the aerodynamic forces and momentum which the aircraft comes in contact with at different speeds, slip angle etc. The electric readings are automatically transferred from the scale to a computerized system of data decoding and interpretation, which is presented to the testing engineers. This data helps the planners ascertain whether the aircraft meets the requirements or needs to be modified.

The Aircraft Characteristics

In developing supersonic aircraft there is a need for a comprehensive set of tests in the supersonic tunnel, in order to check out the aircraft's characteristics.

The tests in the sub-sonic tunnel provide information on the aircraft's characteristics during takeoff, landing, and flight at low speeds, while the tests in the hypersonic and supersonic tunnel are used to test the aircraft's performance in the air.

9565
CSO: 4805

IDF COMBATS SMUGGLING FROM LEBANON

Tel Aviv BAMAHANEH in Hebrew 10 Dec 80 pp 12-14

[Article by Imanuel Rosen: "The End of the Smuggling Season; Since the IDF Went into Action against the Smugglers from Southern Lebanon into Israel, Their Life Has Become Harder; First Part of Study"]

[Text] The phone ring interrupted the investigation of the truck driver by the Investigating Military Police person sitting before him. The investigator picked up the receiver and listened in silence. He nodded, looked through the papers in front of him, and suddenly put down the receiver, looked straight at the driver under investigation, and said: "You are lying!"

It all started early that morning when a military transport truck driver came to an Investigating Military Police station in northern Israel and reported the theft of his truck which he had parked in front of his home in Kiriat Shmoneh the night before. The telephone call which took place during the driver's investigation confirmed the initial suspicion of the investigators--it was not a matter of car theft but a large scale smuggling. At the other end of the wire was the Kiriat Shmoneh police head who reported a chase that night after a military truck, the passengers of which were suspected of smuggling goods from southern Lebanon. The passengers, the police head said, abandoned the truck in Kiriat Shmoneh and ran away. In a search the police found 26,000 packs of cigarettes and electric appliances valued at more than 1.5 million pounds. The number of the truck was the same as the one reported by the driver who was sitting at that moment in the IMP office.

The investigators, who in recent years have become quite adept in dealing with all sorts of smuggling from southern Lebanon to Israel, realized that the driver was trying to cover up his own complicity in the aborted smuggling attempt.

After a short investigation the suspicions were substantiated: The driver named another soldier and a civilian who asked him to be their driver. He refused to drive himself, but agreed to leave the truck at a prearranged place, with open door and with key, to enable someone else to use the truck for the smuggling. For his "service" he was to receive 10,000 pounds.

In the course of the investigation the IMP found out additional facts: Another soldier, also in regular service, had received 10,000 from the civilian in return for driving the truck into southern Lebanon. The same civilian had made similar offers to many soldiers in the area, always for a sum around 10,000. Besides the two soldiers who were caught, all the others had refused the offers.

The circumstances of the chase after the smugglers in uniform were described by the person in charge of the IDF forces in the area that night: "Early that evening we got the word about a Mercedes truck carrying a suspicious cargo about to arrive at the fence. We carefully checked every truck, until late at night the reported truck arrived. We stopped it and closed the gate so the driver could not escape. The gate commander went up on the truck and saw that all the barrels were overturned. He was about to get off when he noticed one barrel fall, and underneath it there were dozens of cartons of cigarettes. He yelled to me: "It's smuggling!" The driver heard him, entered the cab, started to drive, ramming through the gate, and drove at high speed, while the gate commander was still on the truck. We started the chase. We alerted several units who put barriers on the road. We finally found the gate commander all beaten up near Kfar Yovel on the Lebanese border, and after many hours of searching the truck with all the loot was found near Hurshat Tal."

The three accomplices were severely punished. The driver who had lent his truck received 6 months in jail plus 1 year and one-half conditional jail term, his driver's license was revoked for 1 year, and he was demoted from corporal to private. The soldier who drove the truck with the smuggled merchandise was given 8 months in jail plus 1 year and one-half conditional jail term, his driver's license was revoked for 1 year, and he too was demoted from corporal to private. The civilian lost his investment of 1.5 million pounds and was sentenced by a civilian court to 1 year in jail.

It was discovered during the trial that it was the civilian's second smuggling operation and that for a long time he had been offering soldiers to conduct smuggling for him. One of the soldiers who refused his offer reported him to the police and provided the information which thwarted the large scale smuggling.

Smuggling to the Customer's Door

This story is only one of many which occupy the Israeli Police, the Military Police, and the IDF authorities since the end of the Litani Operation. The establishment of the "good fence" and the cultivating of good relations with the people of southern Lebanon has also been an invitation to thieves. The opportunity of getting cigarettes, liquor, perfume, and electric appliances at prices which are one quarter or even less than the price in Israel has turned the Lebanese border into a favorite place for smugglers.

Only with the IDF getting into the picture, headed by the Military Police and the IMP, this problem was being brought under control. Last year alone millions of pounds worth of merchandise was captured. But the Israel Police and the Military Police estimate that tens of millions of pounds worth of smuggling did go through.

In the web of the smugglers are caught many innocent soldiers and civilians, some of whom are seduced by an easy profit, like the owner of the truck who sought to make a seemingly fast profit.

The easily negotiable "good fence" attracts all sorts of smugglers. Some are ordinary people who take a personal risk to acquire a transistor radio or even a pack of Marlboro for half price, but some are professional smugglers whose profits run into the millions.

Behind the smuggling from southern Lebanon there is set pattern or an organized network of smugglers. What is typical about them is the lack of sophistication or special planning. Generally there is someone behind the operation who put up the money, invariably a civilian who lives in the border area. All this person has to do is turn to people who are allowed to enter southern Lebanon with heavy vehicles (who are generally soldier), offer them a small sum of money, and wait at an agreed place. Within a few hours the merchandise can be distributed throughout Israel and sold cheaply. There are, however, no regular networks, and no one so far has done more than three smuggling operations. The reason may be the high risk and also perhaps the fact that most of the smugglers, including the big investors, are not considered professional criminals but rather law abiding citizens, who are seduced by the "big opportunity."

Small scale smuggling also lacks sophistication or any special system. The merchants of southern Lebanon sell everything in any quantity. In order to supply a large quantity of cigarettes, for example, they buy Lebanese cigarettes stamped "Kent" or "Marlboro" as counterfeit American cigarettes. Those merchants are not usually passive. They often offer their wares to innocent soldiers and civilians. For a reasonable sum they will even deliver the merchandise in Israel, provided it is not a large scale smuggling. An Israeli who wants to buy a color television but is afraid to smuggle it into Israel can pay a Lebanese merchant 50,000 pounds (instead of the usual price of 40,000), and hope he will receive the set. This of course is risky, but in most cases he will get it. In other instances the money and the merchant tend to disappear. There is no insurance for such deals or guarantees that the set will indeed perform properly a few hours after delivery.

"The big problem with the smuggling," Major Tzvika, the IMP commander in the Kiriat Shmoneh area says, "is that no one complains about it, since no one loses or is hurt by it. For any crime, a break-in or a rape or simple harassment, there are complaints, since someone is hurt. In smuggling no one loses, not the Lebanese who sold and profited, or the smugglers who got their 10,000 pounds within half an hour, or the merchant who put up the money and sold the merchandise, or the merchant who bought it, or even the customer who bought a pack of cigarettes for a reduced price. They have all profited, except for the State of Israel, which loses with each case of large scale smuggling millions of pounds which add up to tens of millions each year."

Only once smugglers were caught because of complaint. It was the complaint of a Lebanese citizen, who reported a group of soldiers who had bought cigarettes from him for 270,000 pounds (!), and did not deliver the agreed sum. But this was an isolated case. Generally there is perfect cooperation between the Israeli smugglers and the Lebanese. There is no need for special connections with the Lebanese merchant--he is not a criminal and he is willing to deal with strangers. Only in large scale smuggling is there a need for prior coordination, to get the merchandise ready.

The contact between the investor and the organizer of the smuggling and the "workers" need not be regular either, and the investor does not need to be personally acquainted with the people who work for him. According to a local resident, who saw and heard about many cases of smuggling, "Many operations begin when a large military truck driven by a new driver who does not know the area

arrives for a night or a few nights, at Kiriat Shmoneh or another nearby palce. The word gets around fast and reaches the person who is looking to finance an operation. He approaches the new driver and makes him an offer which is hard to refuse. Something like: 'Tonight you will enter southern Lebanon with your truck, and in a certain place there are some cases of cigarettes and a few television sets--go get them and bring them to my place and you will get 10,000 pounds.' The young innocent soldier, whose pay barely last till the end of the month, may be led to believe it is a good opportunity to make an easy profit, and accepts. If he is afraid, he is asked to "lend" the truck for one evening, for good pay. In some instances when the driver refuses he may be threatened or pressured in certain ways."

Sometimes the smuggling takes place in cooperation with soldiers who serve in the area and have easier and safer access to southern Lebanon. A series of bribes to soldiers in the area enables the investor to insure the safe arrival of his merchandise to its destination. "This situation," a senior officer who is a unit commander in the area says, "worries us and hurts our security role."

The Largest Smuggling

But the fact that the bribe system is not sophisticated and "professional" helps the IMP people and others to trap the smugglers. One such case which was widely reported lately in the media, is the story of a young first lieutenant who served in the Kiriat Shmoneh area and was involved in organizing smuggling operations into Israel.

The story of the capture of that first lieutenant began when the police in Kiriat Shmoneh was tipped off about a large quantity of smuggled merchandise which was found at the home of a Kfar Yovel resident. The police raided the house and found 11,000 packs of cigarettes, four tape recorders, and a color television set. The resident tole the police and the customs officials that while doing reserve duty he conducted the smuggling all by himself.

The fact that he was a reserve soldier required that the investigation be turned over to the IMP. During the latter's investigation it turned out that he had a partner--a first lieutenant, his commander in the reserves. Moreover, the soldier reported that his commander had made him the offer to participate in the smuggling and planned the whole thing.

The two were involved in three smuggling operations. The first was relatively small, the second larger, and the third--in which they were caught--the largest. The merchandise smuggled the first two times was sold by the officer to different merchants in Israel. The loot of the third attempt was found at the home in Kfar Yovel before it was distributed.

This case, aside from the fact that it implicated and IDF officer, is typical. A contact between a local civilian and a soldier with status who serves in the area.

Another story involves four soldiers--a private, a corporal, a sergeant, and a staff sergeant--whose smuggling, adding up to 6 million pounds, earned them stiff punishments by a military court.

It started last April 19, when a detail of military police set an ambush near the fence of the Lebanese border after being tipped off. At 2:25 am the suspected truck crossed the gate into southern Lebanon and an hour later headed back for Israel. A private was sitting next to two civilians. The sergeant who was the gate commander at the time allowed the truck to return to Israeli territory without checking it. As the truck began to move it was stopped by a military police jeep. On the truck were found 43 Czech-made carpets 55,000 packs of American cigarettes.

It turned out that two days before he was captured the private had met with the resident of an Arab village in the Galilee and planned to smuggle different items into Israel. The night before they were caught the soldier along with two civilians, using a military vehicle, smuggled in 23 carpets, 8 meat grinders, and 45,000 packs of cigarettes.

The next day the soldier met his friend the corporal and offered him 5,000 pounds for "lending" his truck for the night. The corporal agreed and late at night gave him the truck along with the keys and the registration card. The card, incidentally, was stolen by the driver from his unit's transport office. He entered four fictitious trips in the card.

The third defendant, the sergeant, served at the time in the reserves and was responsible for opening the gate. It turned out he knew one of the civilians who was implicated in the case. During the previous two operations he let the truck go through the gate in return for 35,000 pounds.

In one of those previous operations was implicated a staff sergeant, who lent his truck and drove it for 20,000 pounds. In this operation 33,000 packs of cigarettes and glassware were smuggled into Israel. A few days later the staff sergeant's truck brought 23,000 additional packs of cigarettes.

The total loot of the two civilians and the four soldiers in the four operations added up to 180,000 packs of American cigarettes, 66 carpets, 8 electric meat grinders, and additional items totalling 6 million pounds!

This case represented according to the military police in the area the largest smuggling operation ever to take place between southern Lebanon and Israel. The sentences were equally weighty: The sergeant was given a year in jail, his driver's license, both military and civilian, was suspended for 5 years, and he was demoted to private. The private was given 4 months in jail and his license was suspended for 3 years. The staff sergeant was given a year in jail and demoted to private rank. The corporal was given 6 months in jail, his license was suspended for 3 years, and he was demoted to private rank.

Not a Lost War

Such sentences await all large scale smugglers, but according to Major Tzvika of the IMP the problem arises with small instances of smuggling. Thus, a soldier who was caught with a few bottles of perfume in his pocket was given a relatively easy punishment by his commander.

The chances of catching smugglers have grown lately considerably, and the war against smuggling, which seemed lost after the Litani Operation, is now showing good results. "Today," Major Tzvika says, "I am almost sure that all large scale smuggling is uncovered. I cannot say the same about small and medium size operations, which are still a difficult problem which is far from resolved."

Indeed, civilian police and customs officials with whom I have spoken admit that without the IDF's intervention there was no way of capturing most of the smugglers--large and small. Until the IDF got into the picture the law enforcement agents were not getting anywhere.

"I admit," a police officer in the area told me, "that we have not and still do not attribute enough importance to this matter, either because of manpower problems or because of more urgent problems, like drugs and murder."

The customs officials also admit that only the IDF can stop or at least minimize the problem. "The way the customs officials deal with the smuggling from Lebanon is ludicrous, considering the number of people assigned to this task and our freedom to act in an area which is actually a military zone," a senior customs official told me. "Until the IDF came we were considered a joke. Now, with the IDF cooperating with customs and the police, you can say that the subject is given its proper treatment, although more has to be done."

The military police and the IDF forces at the Lebanese border know that they have no choice but to carry the lion's share of the burden. "Precisely because of this," First Lieutenant Shay, who is the military police man in charge of the problem of smuggling from southern Lebanon, tells us, "our shortage of manpower and means is evident. We manage ot make do with a limited number of men and vehicles, but we coudl do a lot better if we had additional manpower."

How does the military police succeed in catching the smugglers? Where do the petty smugglers hide their merchandise? How does the smuggling affect the readiness and security on the Lebanese border? More on this in the next installment.

9565
CSO: 4805

STUDY CONCLUDES MOVING 'GREEN LINE' NECESSARY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Dec 80 Weekend Supplement pp 20-21

[Article by Ilan Sh'hori: "The Green Line: Pushing Israel's Border 3 Kilometers Eastward and Other Small Changes Are Necessary for Implementing Autonomy in West Bank, Team of Scholars at Tel Aviv University, Aided by Arab Students and Teachers, Conclude"]

[Text] How will the administrative border of Israel, the "green line," look if autonomy is established in the West Bank, or if peace is concluded with Jordan, and the evacuation of a large portion of the West Bank is considered? Will the new-old eastern border of Israel be determined only politicians and military personnel, or will they consult geodesists, geographers, and economists? Will they repeat the "fatal" mistake of drawing an arbitrary border, as happened after the War of Independence? Back then it brought economic ruin to dozens of settlements which were severed from their fields. Will the political leaders take care of this problem this time around?

As part of a study project about peace conducted by Tel Aviv University, a long study was completed on the subject of the green line as the eastern border of Israel. The study took 3 years, and was conducted by a team headed by geographer Moshe Braver, which treated in depth the border area, weighing various foreign relations problems, economic, demographic, geographic. The study included polls and interviews with thousands of residents in about 90 Arab villages in the West Bank along the green line.

The conclusions of the study, which will presented to people in government, are unequivocal: In order not to repeat the mistake made in 1949 in determining the green line (not to mention the new border after the withdrawal in the Sinai), the existing green line needs to be pushed 3-5 km easterward and southward. This is a border change of some 1,100 skm, about 20 percent of the West Bank, which will be added to Israel, by annexing several large Arab towns and villages, especially in Samaria, including Qalqilia and Tul Karm.

For 18 years the ceasefire line between Israel and Jordan, which was set in Spring 1949, has served as the political border between the two countries. The location of the border was determined by the status in which the War of Independence ended, except for some slight changes which were intended to allow Israel to use routes along the coast and between the coast and Jerusalem and the Valley of Jezreel. The border determination, which was marked on the maps which accompanied the

Israeli-Jordanian ceasefire agreements, was based on military and political considerations. The intention was to gain military control of vital routes with disregard to geographic and demographic factors unless they had direct influence upon local military considerations. The disregard for geographical factors had to do with the fact that the drawing of the green line was done strictly by military representatives of both sides.

The ceasefire line between Israel and Jordan was nicknamed the "green line" because it was printed in green ink on the maps issued by the Israeli government's department of surveys in 1949. Later on the name was attributed to the fact that the area on the Israeli side is cultivated while the Jordanian side is barren or semi-cultivated with primitive methods.

From the signing of the ceasefire agreement to the Six-Day War the political border between Israel and Jordan was completely closed, except for the Mandelbaum Gate in Jerusalem. There was no other contact between the residents on both sides. In time the green line became an ethnic border separating between Jews and Arabs, except for Samaria, where the border divided two populated Arab areas. After the Six-Day War the dam was broken. The green line became an administrative border and all its military characteristics disappeared. What remained in the area is the different cultural landscape of the settlements on both sides, which underwent completely separate processes and changes. The head of the study, Prof Moshe Braver, posited that the green line will continue to exist in the future, even if its location and role will change. His objective was to see whether it was desirable to change it in ways which will limit its negative effect on the population, adjusting it to the geographical conditions of the area through which it passes. The assumption was that the border changes could be part of a political compromise in the future in regard to the West Bank.

Most of the study was based on field work done by Arab students and teachers, graduates of the department of geography at Tel Aviv University. They visited and studied 84 Arab villages east of the green line. They gathered data from village heads, school principals and teachers, dignitaries and elders. The interviewees were not afraid to answer questions, since the study was conducted solely by Arabs. In addition to the answers during conversations, questionnaires will be filled out. The numbers of those who went to work in Israel in the morning and those who returned to their village in the evening were counted. Statistical data dating back to the British Mandate was used. Reports of Jordanian commanders dating back to the 50s and 60s in the West Bank, and the data of the IDF commander in the area after the Six Day War were also used.

Prof Braver's study gives detailed description of the places and villages through which the green line ran in 1949 in the Gilboa area, the Carmel, the Sharon, the Jerusalem Corridor, and the Judean mountains. Dozens of Arab villages and towns were deprived of their source of sustenance when the border crossed their lands. The green line ran through 57 Arab villages on its eastern side, and 8 on the western. It cut through the width of the Jordan Valley, the Gilboa area, and all the cultivated land of Tul Kara in the Sharon.

These facts had influenced all of the West Bank. The greatest damage was caused to some 50 settlements closest to the green line, defined in the study as the "border strip area."

During the British Mandate these settlements were part of the coast and the Valley of Jezreel, both economically and in terms of transportation and services. The quick growth of Arab and Jewish orchards, and other branches of agriculture, and the quick growth of urban population and new urban centers along the coast, created a great demand for hired hands. Many of the border strip residents considered the coastal lands and the valley their fertile and profitable land, which enabled them to change from autarkic to commercial agriculture.

A Push to Immigrate

During that period, according to the study, there was a constant natural growth of the population, especially because of the elimination of health hazards, like swamps. This growth created more employment problems and a search for work outside the village. According to Prof Braver, the increased dependence of the border strip residents was not only the result of natural growth but also the fact that the area absorbed many Arab immigrants who came from places in the surrounding area and in neighboring countries. Those were drawn by the sources of employment which the rapid economic growth of the coastal and valley areas had created. The numerous army camps which were built during WWII added to the growth. The camput needed agricultural produce, especially vegetables, which stimulated agriculture production. Gradually most of the villages became dependent for their existence on marketing their produce along the coast.

Many Arab villages also established satellite-villages (Khirba in Arabic) on the fringe of the coast and the valley, which grew quickly, and sometimes outgrew the parent village, which lost its population. Kfar Kasm, for instance, a satellite-village of Meshah (about 6 km to the east), back in the 40s was larger than the parent village. Social, familial ties, and work partnership existed between the two, and thus the border and the coast settlements developed strong social links.

The study stresses that when the green line was established the coastal settlements were severed from the border ones, which meant cutting off sources of subsistence, vital services (including modern transportation like roads and railroads), thus causing serious problems, hardship, and deterioration. The border settlements had to look elsewhere, in the mountain region, which does not have the resources and the economic activities capable of providing an alternative to the coast. The study revealed, for example, that in the village of Rumanah in the southern Carmel about 80 percent of the families were affected economically. The village lost 70 percent of its cultivated land. Tul Karm, for instance, lost 90 percent of its land and 42 percent of the families lost their main source of income. In Qalqilia 60 percent of the families were affected and 60 percent of the land was lost.

This economic hardship prompted many of the residents to emigrate; many men went to the Arab oil countries. This process, which started in the early 50s, reached its peak in the middle 60s, and in some of the border settlements the population went down despite an average annual growth rate of 2.8 percent. An IDF census showed that in 1967 most of these villages had more women between the ages of 15-45 than men. In some there were twice as many women ages 18-30 than men. In Kafun, for example, there were only 52 men for every 100 women; in Atil there were 49 men for every 100 women. In Tul Karm there were 77 and in Qalqilia 82.

The Six-Day War and the political changes it caused brought a fundamental change in the role of the green line, which became an administrative, rather than a totally separative, line, open for free movement between the West Bank and Israel. The green line continued to separate between different areas in terms of government, administration, services, and socio-economical and political processes, but is no longer a geographical barrier. This change has had a beneficial effect on the border population, opening up broad opportunities for new integration in the economical activities and the services of the coastal and the valley areas, similar to the pre-1948 era. Indeed, soon after the Six-Day War the border population turned to the coast and the valley and restored the old dependency of economical activity and services upon the coastal area. Prof Braver maintains that today the dependency is much greater than the pre-1948 one.

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 1979 some 30 percent of the West Bank residents were employed in Israel. The study shows that an average of 41 percent of the residents of the border area were employed in Israeli, and in some villages the rate exceeded 50 percent. In Bit Surah, for example, there were 66 percent men dependent on Israel for their employment. In Katnah the rate was 64 percent, and in Baka A-Sharkiya, 58 percent.

The border population differs from the rest of the West Bank also in fact that many women from the border area are employed in Israel, which is similar to the situation in Arab villages inside Israel. In a sample taken in six large places of employment in the Sharon and the Ashqlon area, including packaging plants, industrial plants, hospitals and farms, it was found that of the 141 women from the West Bank employed in those places, all came from the border area.

It was found that not only do most of the border residents depend economically on the coast, where they find employment and market their produce, but also because of the close ties between the border and the coast population there has been a noticeable change in the lifestyle and buying habits of the local residents.

At the same time, ties with the inland population have weakened, now that the post-1948 dependency diminished. The need for the inland transportation system, centered in the local towns, shrunk considerably. In a survey of villages only 10 km from Nabulus, it was found out that many men and women did not go to Nabulus or other towns even once in recent years.

A Yearning for an Open Border

Since the opening of the green line there has been a significant demographic change in the area: The natural birth rate went up, emigration went down, and new settlers came to the area. With new work opportunities in Israel the emigration of men practically stopped. It was proved that whenever there was a drop in demand for workers from the West Bank the emigration of men started anew.

In recent years dozens of small industries were established in the area, selling mostly to Israeli customers. Most of them bought their raw material and equipment in Israeli. Prof Braver shows that the integration of the border area in Israel is also proved by the high percentage of wor age men who speak or understand Hebrew. Along the border area in Gilboa and Hebro 20 percent of the population know Hebrew, and along the Sharon it reaches 45 percen. Among those who work in Israel some 51 percent know Hebrew.

Natanyah is a point of attraction for the young Arabs from the border area, as an entertainment center. In the summer they come to the beach. The number of Israeli visitors (Arab and Jewish) in the border area is larger than in the mountain area. Car count taken at four different times showed that the number of cars coming and going from Israel was 3-4 times greater.

How does the local population feel about the location and the role of the green line? All those questioned said that the green line totally ignored the needs of the population and caused serious economic damage. To the question, "Should comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arabs (including the Palestinians) be achieved, which will require the establishment of a border between Israel and the West Bank, that is, the renewal of the green line as a political border, where in your opinion should the new border run and what should be its character," 74 percent of the interviewees replied that the position and role of the new green line should enable the population to continue to maintain its ties with the coast. Seventeen percent argued that the green line should be left where it is now. Five percent refused to make any changes in the green line.

In sum, Prof Braver states that in view of the findings of the study, it will be necessary to examine carefully the question of the future of the border area, and the position and character of the green line, when the political discussion begins. In his conclusions and recommendations Prof Braver points out that it is safe to assume that leaving the green line as it is today will bring disaster to the local population, and will accelerate the process of decline. At the same time, one should not overlook the fact that the position and role of the green line in the future will influence Israel in terms of the large work force which originates in the West Bank, especially in the border area. The green line, once established, must be pushed eastward (and in the north southward), so that most of the present border area population will be included in the region on which it is so dependent, namely, Israel. The new green line should be examined in every section in terms of the relationship between the local population and the area, the lands, the agricultural resources, the water sources, the access, relief factors, etc. In addition, arrangements of local exchange of farm land between villages should be considered.

Prof Braver adds that pushing the green line eastward, as he suggests, will greatly reduce the problem of ground water and will diminish the danger of ground water used by the local authorities established in the West Bank, which can affect water resources vital for Israel. Prof Braver admits that a special problem will arise regarding the green line in the Jerusalem area, but his study does not deal with this problem. According to his recommendations some 190,000 people will be added to the Israeli population, which will increase the minorities from 16 to 20 percent.

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BIR ZAYT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AIR VIEWS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Dec 80 Weekend Supplement pp 18-19

[Article by Ya'aqov Havaquq: "Bir Zayt: The Military Government Enabled Bir Zayt University To Become Center for Nationalistic Activities in Territories; Open Student Demonstrations and Faculty Statements; Bir Zayt's Secret: Its Source of Financing."]

[Text] Ahmed, a native of the town of Al-Tahariyah in Mount Hebron, who teaches English at Bir Zayt University, stopped in the corridor of one of the university buildings, breathing heavily. For a long while he weighed the question directed to him. His jowls worked angrily, and his brown eyes rolled nervously. "I'll be honest with you, and you may not like it," he started in a low voice. "You are asking me hard, pointed questions, and you expect an honest answer. You must understand that as an Israeli you are suspect. How do I know you are not an agent of the Shin Bet posing as a reporter? I am sure my colleagues and my students feel the same way." When he mentioned the word mukhabarat (Israeli intelligence), a word which makes every student at Bir Zayt shiver, a stocky young man with a 3-4 day beard went by. He gave us an angry look and went over to a group of students who stood in the yard outside the corridor. In a moment they were all gone.

Only two students continued to walk by together. "You see," Ahmed said emphatically, "they saw you and they disappeared right away. Who is left? Only those two, who are blind."

Bir Zayt University is not eager to welcome Israelis, to put it mildly. Any Israeli who happens to go through the university or the nearby town of Bir Zayt is considered an agent of Israeli security authorities. Old stone houses covered with nationalistic slogans and stones scattered everywhere bear witness to what has happened here. A small barefoot child appears from one of the alleys. He sticks his tongue out at us and makes a V with his fingers, undoubtedly imitating his elders.

Private and Political Affair

Bir Zayt University, one of the four universities in the West Bank, is a private institution. It was founded in 1924 by Reviha Nasser as an elementary school for children from the surrounding villages. Six years later it was expanded to include a secondary school and a co-ed dormitory. In 1953 the first post-secondary class started, and 8 years later a second year was added. The name was then changed to Bir Zayt College and the school was recognized by the American University in Beirut. Its graduates could now enter school in Beirut for their academic degrees. Shortly thereafter other Arab universities in the West Bank followed suit.

The Jordanian authorities, for their own reasons, did not allow the school to develop rapidly. All requests by the school to be allowed to confer academic degrees were rejected. In 1972 the school turned to the Israeli authorities and asked for permission to add 2 more years so as to be able to confer bachelor degrees. A few months later, in March 1973, the military government approved the request, but refused to award the school a permanent license. In 1976 the first class graduated Bir Zayt University with the first bachelor degrees ever confered in the West Bank.

Bir Zayt, best known of the schools in the West Bank, and not necessarily because of its academic level, now has about 1,600 students from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel, and a few dozen foreign students, nearly all children of Arabs naturalized in the U.S. or of representatives of charitable organizations working in the territories on behalf of the Palestinians. The staff, some 150 teachers and lecturers, represents a broad spectrum of well known and obscure institutions from Europe, the U.S., the Middle East, and even China. The school is run by a special council headed by Dr Hana Nasser. Dr Nasser, son of the owners of the institution, was expelled in November 1974 because of incitement, and according to the Bir Zayt bulletin he runs the school from his office at Amman University. The Executive council is assisted by a board of trustees, consisting of 14 members. The best known are Dr Haydar Abd Al-Shafi, the chairman of the Red Crescent association in the Gaza Strip and a sympathizer of the PLO; Karim Khalaf, mayor of Ramallah; Abd al-Juad Salah, mayor of Al Birah, who was expelled. Most of the trustees are known to be ardent supporters of the extreme faction within the PLO.

The people at Bir Zayt are willing to talk about the academic aspects of the school. The program is similar to that of the American University in Beirut. The language of instruction here too is English. There are four departments--humanities, engineering, exact sciences, and business and economics. Soon, Dr Sari Nuseiba, chairman of the teachers' association explains, two additional departments will open up--medicine and law. This will make Bir Zayt equal to the major universities in the Arab world.

The people at Bir Zayt are also willing to talk about the academic importance of the school, but they are not willing to talk about politics and the delicate balancing of political and extracurricular activities. "We are scholars, lecturers, academicians," they say, "we have no interest in extraneous matters." But despite the excessive caution, the shadow of politics hovers over every conversation. They talk at length about the excesses of the military government, the suppression of freedom of speech, but no one is willing to talk about the other side of the coin--themselves.

Dr Kamal Abd al-Fatah, a stocky middle aged person, who teaches geography and is the dean of the humanities department, was educated in Germany and lives today in Ramallah. He complains the Israeli media presents Bir Zayt University in a negative light. He thinks this image is the result of the military government's bri fing. "The Israeli military government wishes to present us as an active source of nationalistic militancy. It seeks to influence public opinion in order to make it easier for itself to act against us."

"Dr al-Fatah, could it also be your fault? You hold conventions and you prevent Israeli journalists from attending. When the 'Palestine Week' opened not one Israeli journalist was allowed to cover the event. Doesn't this give food for thought?"

Dr Al-Fatah: "I don't want to get into it. We are a recognized academic institution, of a high level. We have a large library, we do interesting research, and our teachers are invited to symposia in different schools around the world."

"But you will agree that what has made Bir Zayt University famous is not its academic activity or library, as you try to present it, but rather its extracurricular activities."

Munir Pasha, a lecturer dealing with student affairs, joins the conversation. "Look," he says, "we have extensive cultural activities in the university, including the 'Palestine Week.' We have been holding it for 5 years. This year, because of the wishes of the government, it was presented as a political-nationalistic event, which is a blatant distortion. What was 'Palestine Week' in reality? There were ten sections in this cultural-artistic event: There were pictures, books, films, prisoners' handcraft, house utensils etc. All the exhibits are available in the stores, and everything we displayed in known to the authorities. What is all the excitement about? Why present it in such an extreme negative light?"

"I am told the pictures in the exhibition were not so innocent. They contained nationalistic symbols etc."

Munir Pasha raises his voice: "Let me explain something. Our main problem at Bir Zayt is the hatred against us. Everyone hates us. We try to give our students a broad education, especially teach them to think. If a student comes to me holding the flag of China, I won't ask him what is he doing. To me he is like any other student anywhere. I always say to my students: 'Do what you think is right. You, and only you, will decide in the final analysis what you are going to be." This is what we do at Bir Zayt, and this is why we are frowned upon."

"You talk about the Chinese flag and freedom of thought. Don't you think the raising of the Palestinian flag inside the university is something the military government cannot accept?"

Dr al-Fatah is shaken out of his calm and answers for his colleague: "We are Palestinians, and this is something no one can take away from us. What do you expect a Palestinian student to do, waive a West German flag? Isn't Palestine his homeland? At the same time we are an educational institution. We are not a center for the dissemination of Palestinian nationalistic theory as you try to imply. The nationalistic theory is determined by people on the other side of the border. Not us. Ture, we are Palestinians, and proud of it. No one can diminish our national consciousness, unless he destroys us physically. Let me give you an example: I can open this door a crack, halfway, or all the way. But a person's mind, especially thinking people like us, I cannot open halfway, you understand? Now figure it out for yourself!"

"In other words, Bir Zayt University is an academic institution like any other in Israel or throughout the world. You have determined that the goal of the school is to teach, to educate, and to facilitate the freedom of thought of every student. Then how does this square with what Dr Gabi Bramhi, the vice president of the university said in an interview with Reuter correspondent Alan Elsner (an interview which was translated into Arabic and published on November 5 in AL-SHA'B and AL-FAJR)? Without a national government in the area taking care of the needs of the

population, Dr Gabi Bramhi says, the university has taken upon itself to partially play this part...Only 4 years after the establishment of the school it already has a great influence in the West Bank; its graduates are the educated leaders in the area; they were educated in a Palestinian institution without any allegiance to any government...The Palestinian university at Bir Zayt, in the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River, has distinguished itself as a center of resistance to Israeli occupation...Several times this year student demonstrations went out of the university to the streets, and the students erected stone barriers on the main road leading to two new Israeli settlements, burned car tires, and threw stones at Israeli vehicles...We prepare the students to assume responsibilities in the hope they will hold positions of responsibility in their society...How do you explain the discrepancy between what you say and what Dr Bramhi says?"

Dr al-Fatah: "I don't know exactly what Dr Bramhi has said, and I am not so sure he actually made these statements. It seems to me he meant that each of our graduates will be a leader in his specific field of study, and not in the political arena. If he studies economics, he will be an economic leader, a good competent economist. This is what he seems to imply."

Munir Fasha interrupts his colleague: "I would like to clarify that our problem is the pressure and the terrorism directed against us by the government. We cannot obtain scientific material or publications which appear in the Arab world, which, of course, impairs our scientific competence. The pressure does not help us. For instance, two of our teachers became victims of unexplained behavior by the Israeli authorities. One, Ali Za'ab, was arrested simply because he had in his briefcase a red headdress, which he used to keep warm. The other, Dr Juad Baruti, who is a U.S. citizen, was barred from teaching at the university. He was not given any explanation. They didn't give him a letter. He is left hanging."

And Now the Students

One of the most active groups on and off campus is the student council. The council, made up of nine members, is responsible for mediating and communicating between the administration and the student body. The council consists of five committees: Volunteer work committee; cultural committee; cafeteria committee; finance committee; art committee; and social committee. Each committee is responsible for a specific area, but the perimeters of the area are not well defined.

Dr Sari Nuseiba, son of Anwar Nuseiba, who arranged our tour at Bir Zayt University, suggested we spoke to Abd Rabba and Hassan 'Abdallah, two key members of the student council. Hassan 'Abdallah ("Abu al-Az"), age 26, an Arabic student from the village of Kadum in the Tul Karm region, was a security prisoner who served a jail term in the Nabulus prison from 1973 to 1977. He says: "We are Palestinian students who are absolutely loyal to our land. We want to live here, on our land, as Palestinians. These are emotional human feelings, not merely political. We have heard a great deal in the Israeli media, that Bir Zayt is a center of nationalism and PLO support. I would like to ask: Who does not support the PLO? Nearly the entire world recognizes and supports the PLO, and only you, the Israelis, are closing your eyes. The PLO is our only legitimate representative. I, a student at Bir Zayt, must agree with this given. As students, we are expected not only to pursue our course of study but also to open our eyes and raise our consciousness and our involvement in the region."

Hassan 'Abdallah adds: "Our first purpose is to study. But this does not mean we are to ignore our environment. I cannot deny that the students at Bir Zayt, like most Palestinians, support the PLO and its principles. I cannot deny that we celebrate national Palestinian events on campus. I cannot deny that from time to time we are asked to demonstrate, throw rocks, protest the government's policy in the territories according to developments. But this does not mean we spend most of our time in political activities!"

His friend Mufid 'Abd Rabba adds: "The students at Bir Zayt have a right to express their views. As a Palestinian living under the shadow of Israeli occupation I would lie if I said I am filled with joy each time Israeli Phantom jets bomb refugee camps in southern Lebanon; I would lie if I said I did not feel sympathy and express support for the political and administrative prisoners who suffer in jail. I remember this suffering even as I have not forgotten such murders as Dir Yassin. I would like to ask, why are you Jews allowed to protest the oppression of Jews in the Soviet Union or attacks on Jews in France, while I, as a Palestinian, cannot protest the injustice you commit against my brethren?"

The members of the Bir Zayt student council are no less careful in their statements than their teachers. They do not wish to be caught saying the wrong thing. They are willing to make statements but not so much to answer questions. They prefer talking about the actions of the government to telling about the activities of the students they and their friends in the council lead.

The various committees of the student council do not limit themselves to the campus and their activities are not confined to relationships between the students and the administration. The committee members take their friends out to the towns and villages, to the "Palestinian masses" in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As part of their studies the students are required to do a certain quota of volunteer community service. The school publications show the students working in the fields, sowing, reaping, and collecting. But the top priority of their service is eliminating illiteracy. The students, who are seen by the leaders of the school and the future leadership, teach thousands of illiterates how to read and write. This two becomes a means to an end. The publication "The Student," issued by "The Supreme Committee for Fighting Ignorance and for Adult Education in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip," charts the course of study along clear and militant nationalistic channels. The first issue, which came out in January 1980, shows on the back page a map of Palestine which includes all the land west of the Jordan. All settlements on the map are Arab, and even the Negey appears as the "Palestinian Desert."

A Guided Tour

Our visit at Bir Zayt was prearranged and therefore became an "anemic tourist visit." We were constantly escorted by a guide, and were not allowed any free movement or direct contact with students and faculty. When we asked for the publications of the school, we were only given a lavish brochure in English, apparently used for foreign applicants. "We don't have any other literature," the school spokesman said. It turned out that Bir Zayt happens to be active in the area of publications, but those are earmarked to very specific addresses across the border. Thus, for example, the school collects and translates all Israelei press articles about the university, especially those which present the school as a nationalistic Palestinian center, and from time to time these pamphlets are sent to neighboring countries. The purpose of these publications is to create an image of an important institution in the territories, which brings in considerable donations.

One of Bir Zayt University's best kept secrets are its sources of financial support. Anyone asked about it shrugged his shoulders and said "donations," without another word of explanation. Some referred us to the school's board of trustees, as the fund raising body. When we turned to members of the board we were turned down. Two of them even slammed the phone down muttering a curse.

A former teacher at Bir Zayt University, who wished to remain anonymous, says: "I am not surprised they are not willing to say where the money for the school comes from. I am sure they have a good reason to keep it secret." From some of the things the man said not for publication, it can be understood that the sources which finance the institution can dictate when to become active and what ideas to spread and where.

The military government follows with interest the goings on at lively Bir Zayt. The fact that the students happen to be, mostly not by accident, in most of the centers of ferment in the territories provides much food for thought. The government is aware of the character of the institution which foments a significant amount of dangerous nationalistic activity. Has it drawn any conclusions?

A senior officer says: "During the last 6 months who have dealt with nearly all the elements of the population. We know we cannot change the basic militant elements, but their behavior patterns, which are the result of pressures, can be changed. All those dealt with learned not to break the law. We did not deal with the universities (because of the summer vacation). The students and the administration at Bir Zayt took advantage of our good will, and instead of learning they became active politically, causing constant disturbances."

Government circles stress that Bir Zayt has become a school which can give academic degrees under Israeli but not under Arab-Jordanian rule. "If our cooperative attitude is oppression, what can they say about the attitude of the Jordanian authorities?" he wondered.

They admit at Bir Zayt that the military government authorized the conversion of the college into a university, but they are angry with the present policy, especially the amendment of the higher education law. "The amendment violates the Jordanian law, the Geneva Convention, and all moral and human laws," Munir Pasha of Bir Zayt University says. The government categorically disagrees. "The Jordanian law which we have amended said nothing about universities, since during the Jordanian rule there weren't any in the West Bank. All universities in the West Bank were established under Israeli rule. More to the point, the amendment does not limit them and does not affect their academic freedom as they claim it does. There is no academic institution in the world which is not bound by law, only Bir Zayt was above the law for the past several years. This vacuum does not put them above the law. What bothers them is not the law, but the fact that we, the Israelis, make it."

At Bir Zayt they see the government action as a noose which is tightening around their neck. As a Palestinian institution which tries to be independent, the school seeks to prepare tomorrow's leadership, and as an institution which looks to study the Palestinian heritage it is clear to its leaders that the friction with the military government will increase in time. This is an unavoidable process. They continue to conduct field work in studying the condition of the Palestinian population in the territories and talk about the expansion of the school in the near future. The new campus is being built 2 kilometers from the present one, and when

it is finished the school will move to the new place and the old one will revert to its former status of an elementary and a secondary school with dormitories for students from the surrounding area.

At Bir Zayt, not far from the headquarters of West Bank's military government, they know they will not be allowed to go too far. They know that the threat to shut down the school is not over. But they are not deterred. "We act according to conditions in the territories," a member of the student council points out. "If we have to take to the streets, we will! If we have to fight, we will fight! We will not allow them to trample on our rights and obliterate our national identity."

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BRIEFS

ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION -- In the 1980's there will be a significant break-through in the diversification of Israel's sources of energy. Electricity will not be derived from oil alone, but also from coal, nuclear energy, solar energy, and hydro-electric energy. This prognosis was made by the president of the Israeli Association for Nuclear Sciences, Professor Shimon Yiftah, at the convention of the nuclear associations 1981, which was concluded Friday in Beer Sheva. Professor Yiftah added that at the beginning of the present decade Israel is developing five major projects related to energy: The start of a construction of the first nuclear power plant in Israel; building and activating a plant for desalination of sea water, the largest in the world, producing 40,000 cubic meter a day, ten times more than the output in Elat. The technology is the result of Israeli development with American money. The plant is located in Ashdod and will be activated in 2 years; solar pools; the sea canal; deriving uranium from phosphates, as part of the projects to derive phosphoric acid at the Rotem plain in the Negev. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Dec 80 p 12] 9565

PREFERRED FAMILY SIZE -- The number of medium size families, with 3-4 children grew during the last decade, while small families with 1-2 children and large ones, with 5 or more went down, said Minister of Labor and Welfare Dr Israel Katz. At the convention of the Zahavi organization yesterday Dr Katz expressed his support for the large family bill. The bill will be presented this week to the Knesset and the minister will request to refer it to the labor and welfare committee. Minister Katz added that according to the data of the research department of the National Insurance Institute, in 1979 Israel had 480,000 Jewish families with children, including 1,132,000 children, an average of 2.3 children per family. Some 70 percent of the children in small families and 30 percent in large. The main demographic trend clearly seen in the last decade is the growth in medium size families with 3-4 children as compared to the decline in the number of small families with 1-2 children and large ones with over 5 children. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Dec 80 p 11] 9565

GASOHOL PRODUCTION -- The food section of Kur is studying the possibility of using the sugar plant in Afulah which has been inactive for 3 years for producing gasohol (alcohol gasoline), a fuel substitute for motor vehicles. The head of Kur's food section, Binyamin Gibli, told Ma'ariv yesterday that the company which has been working in this area for 3 years was recently told that the government and the office of energy decided to make a special allocation for

this purpose. In the U.S., for example, gasohol constitutes 20 percent of car fuel, while in Brazil 100 gasohol fuel is used. In recent months Kur has been negotiating with companies in the Philippines to establish such a plant in that country. [Text] [Tel aviv HA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Dec 80 p 8] 9565

SOUTH AFRICAN INVESTMENTS -- The rate of South African investments in Israel will increase to 45 million rands during the next 3 years, as compared to 37.5 million until now; up to 20 million rands of Israel Bonds will be sold. The South African Government will also offer Israel 125 million rands export credit. These were the main principles of the economic agreements at the conclusion of the state visit of Senator Owen Horwood, South Africa's minister of finance, in his meetings with Finance Minister Yigal Hurvitz. The two ministers of finance reported about their meetings at a press conference on Friday at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. They stressed that the existing relations should be cultivated and trade and economic ties between the two countries should be expanded. It was pointed out that the agreement which was signed to purchase a million tons of coal by Israel in South Africa is in effect and the question of coal was not discussed at the present meeting. Various economic and business topics will be dealt with by a permanent joint committee, which the two ministers decided to form, made up of senior officials of the two countries. The committee will meet at least once a year. Mr Hurvitz reported that in the course of discussions with the visiting minister he sought to obtain tax exemption for United Jewish Appeal fundraising, similar to the U. S. This matter will be considered by the South African government, and Mr Hurvitz is confident that his request will be granted. In answer to questions he said that the visit of South Africa's finance minister was not played down or kept secret. "Our relations with South Africa are no secret and we do not hide them," Mr Hurvitz pointed out. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Dec 80 p 3] 9565

OPPOSITION TO PRO-BAGHDAD POLICY SAID TO BE WIDESPREAD

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 3 Nov 80 p 32

[Article: "What did King Husayn Say At His Meeting With Army Officers?"]

[Excerpts] Amman -- Special Report -- An extensive meeting between King Husayn and Jordanian army officers was held Sunday morning, 19 October (the first day of the Feast of Immolation). It lasted from 0800 hours to 1300 hours. Nearly all army officers were present. It should be noted that the Jordanian press contented itself with mentioning that the king had received the officers "who came to offer holiday greetings." From the outset the king made it known that the aim of the meeting was to brief the army officers on the latest developments in the Arab countries and the rest of the world. The meeting was basically an inflammatory session for the purpose of indoctrinating the army with the current policies of the regime. The following were some of the more important topics dealt with by the king at the meeting:

- The king defended the regime of Saddam Husayn. He said, "Iraq is striving to recover national rights for all of us, based on the principles of the Arab revolution. We shall support our sister nation Iraq with all the resources at our disposal." He added, "I have offered to send military assistance to brother Saddam, but he only requested that the port of 'Aqabah be opened to Iraq, which has been done. We are prepared, upon request, to provide any assistance, military or other.

- Relations with Syria: The king launched a vicious provocative attack against Syria. He said that relations with Syria were very tense, and that contacts between the two countries were, in effect, completely severed.

- The king denied that any official support was being given to the Muslim Brother hood. However, he said that the regime cannot interfere in matters pertaining to the brotherhood's policies.

The king noted Syria's request for the extradition of two Syrian officers--members of the Muslim Brotherhood gang--who had defected. He said that he had refused to extradite them since he was their host, "and they are here participating with us at this meeting."

- Relations with Libya: The king said that "the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah had offered to use $250 million dollars (allocated for us at the Baghdad Conference) to finance a purchase of arms for us from the Soviet Union. We rejected the offer, requesting the amount in cash, but our request was refused. When brother Saddam heard about the matter, he telephoned to say that Iraq would provide the money. Consequently, relations with Libya became strained."

- Relations with the PLO: The king noted that relations with factions of the Palestinian resistance having ties with the Steadfastness Front, such as the (DFLP?), the (PFLP?) and al-Sa'iqah, are severed. However, relations with certain PLO leaders are good.

- At the beginning of his speech, the king sharply attacked Khomeini and the Islamic revolution, claiming that this was "a revolution of murders and malevolent people who harbored hatred for the Arabs and the Moslem people."

The climate here is extremely charged with animosity against the regime's policies of collaboration with the rulers in Baghdad. Many officers are saying that, because of the regime's policies, the only function the Jordanian army could now have is to play the part of policeman against the Moslem and Arab masses in Pakistan, Oman, Saudi Arabia (a reference to the army's participation in quelling the disturbance at the Holy Mosque in Mecca last year), and finally, Iran.

The regime is currently massing Jordanian army forces on the borders with Iraq and Syria. It is estimated that 310 tanks are stationed there.

Quantities of arms arriving from North Yemen are being sent to Iraq via Jordanian airports and the port of Aqabah.

Finally, a huge radar installation for spying on Syria is being built under American supervision near the Jordanian-Syrian border.

Among the Jordanian masses there is a prevailing mood of resentment and discontent. There is a growing fear that Jordanian forces will be sent to the front with Iran. The citizens have turned away from the government information media which continually repeat the official Iraqi announcements and communiques. As to the Palestinian masses, they do not at all sympathize with the Iraqi regime.

There is growing anxiety among the citizens over this war's negative impact on the economy. Shortages have developed in several basic foods, such as sugar and rice. This in turn has caused sharp price increases and the disappearance of several types of foods which are being appropriated and sent by truck to Iraq.

The Secretariat General of The Grouping of Popular Forces and Professional Associations refused to issue a statement of support for Iraq when called upon by government authorities to do so. With the exception of the leaders of the Journalists' Union (to which Saddam Husayn gave a 1 million dinar contribution) and the Jordanian Economists' Association (which is dominated by former Iraqui Ba'thists), no union has come out in support of the Iraqi regime.

When the Medical Association was asked to send a medical team to Iraq, they refused. They said that if they were compelled to send a team to Iraq, they would also send a medical team to Iran.

Furthermore, there is a prevailing feeling of discontent among the rank and file of the Journalists' Union over the position of their leaders.

There is also a prevailing feeling of discontent among elements of the Muslim Brotherhood over the position of its leaders who until recently claimed that they were supporting the Iranian revolution, but then became silent and renounced their support following the Iraqi regime's war against Iran. It is common knowledge that Hasan al-Tall, the editor of the newspaper AL-LIWA', which has close ties with the brotherhood, has publicly renounced his support for Iran.

9123
CSO: 4802

1981 BUDGET SHOWS 26-MILLION DINAR DEFICIT

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 23 Dec 80 p 13

[Draft Law of the General Budget for the Year Beginning 1 January 1981. Article on approval of draft law by the National Consultative Council was published in JPRS 77161, 13 January 1981, No. 2246 of this series, pp 103-104]

/Text/ This law is titled the General Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 1981. The government's revenues and expenditures for the coming fiscal year are estimated at 611.75 million dinars in revenues and 638.25 million dinars in expenditures. The deficit, which totals 26.5 million dinars, will be covered by an improvement in local revenues and from domestic loans.

Article Five of the draft law stipulates that the allocations set aside will be spent out of private and public fiscal funds supported by financial drafts approved by the General Budget Department.

It is also permissible to issue financial drafts for more than one quarter of the allocations set aside for current or capital expenditures, if by agreement of the minister of finance, if special reasons exist for exceeding this percentage. However, it is not permitted to disburse the allocations listed in the financial drafts for purposes other than those stipulated, and it is not permitted to exceed the allocations contained in these drafts. Nor is it permissible to commit oneself to any sum in excess of the capital allocations contained in financial orders except by agreement of the Council of Ministers, in accodance with a finding of the minister of finance, nor is it permissible to transfer allocations from one chapter to another except by law.

As regards allocations for emergency expenditures, these will be disbursed by decree of the Council of Ministers.

Arab Aid

Article Nine of the law stipulates that Arab aid will be allocated to covering the non-current expenses of the armed forces through the establishment of a special fund for this aid and that disbursement will be made from it in accordance with the agreement of the Council of Ministers.

Herewith are the details of the state budget for the fiscal year 1981:

First: Revenues

Budget revenues are estimated at 611.75 million dinars, which will come from the following areas:

32 million from taxes on incomes and profits.

110 million from customs duties.

17.6 million dinars from other taxes.

21 million from permits.

18.3 million dinars from posts, telephone and telegraph.

27 million from interest and profits.

15.2 million dinars from various revenues.

That is, total current domestic revenues will come to 260 million, in addition to 244 million in Arab financial aid, 2 million in economic and technical aid, 100.75 million dinars from development loans contracted for and 5 million in anticipated loans and aid.

Estimated expenditures for the new fiscal year, which in total amount to 638.25 million dinars, will be as follows:

2,198,000 dinars for the Hashemite Royal Court.

200,000 for the National Assembly.

270,000 for the National Consultative Council.

350,000 for the Office of the Prime Minister.

396,000 for the Accounting Bureau.

137,000 for the Employees' Bureau.

138,000 for the Ministry of Defense.

660,000 for the Ministry of the Interior, 530,000 for general permits; 652,000 for the Civil States Depa-tment; 24.03 million for public security and civil defense; 1.78 million Ministry of Justice; 514,000 for Islamic law; 5,287,000 for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 145.95 million for the Ministry of Finance; 191,000 for the general budget; 2,273,000 for customs; 557,000 for income tax; 1,099,000 for lands and surveys; 899,000 for the Department of Accessories; 583,000 for industry and commerce; 622,000 for general statistics; 140.42 million for the National Planning Council; 75,000 for the Postal Savings Fund, 786,000 for tourism and antiquities; 1,716,000 for municipal and village affairs; 7,184,000 for the Natural Resources Authority; 17.95 million for public works; 5,965,000 for agriculture; 65.5 million for the Jordan Valley Authority; 5.16 million for supplies, 5,781,000 million for education; 16,794,000 for health, 2,825,000 for social development; 37,000 for labor; 365,000 for Occuplied Territory Affairs; 4.96 million for the Potable Water Organization; 404,000 for the Ministry of Information; 2,518,000 for radio-broadcasting; 4.26 million for television broadcasting; 126,000 for printing and publications; 322,000 for the news agency; 114,000 for

culture and youth; 1,335,000 for the Youth Care Organization; 24,000 for culture and the arts; 160,000 for libraries and national archives; 734,000 for the Department of Antiquities; 3.1 million for communications; 10,379,000 for the Telephone Communications Organization; 13,278,000 for transportation; 2,759,000 for civil aviation; and 492,000 for meteorology.

Herewith are the details of the subsidies, bequests and awards allocated for various official and national organizations:

17 million for the Retirement Fund; 2 million for the employee subscription allowance of the Social Insurance Organization; 2.5 million for the Jordanian University; 2.35 million for the Ministry of Religious Endowments; 200,000 for the cooperative organization; 100,000 for the Management Institute; 65,000 for the Aviation Academy; 300,000 for the Vocational Training Institute; 200,000 for the Geographical Center; 12,000 for the Palestinian Retirement Fund; 30,000 for the Royal Society for the Protection of Nature; 8,000 for the Red Crescent; 30,000 for the Shooting Club; 11,000 for the Folklore Museum; 25,000 for the Federation of Labor Unions; 30,000 for labor clinics; 60,000 for the Arabic Language Society; 6,000 for the Journalists' Union; and 150,000 for the Organization of the People of the House.

In addition, the budget has made provisions for the sum of 24 million in fuel subsidies and 18 million in supply subsidies.

1187
CSO: 4802

CAYMAN ISLANDS BECOMING INVESTMENT CENTER

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 2 Dec 80 p 14

[Article: "Cayman Islands: Unfamiliar New Center for Kuwaiti Investments; Kuwaiti Elements Buy Share in Petroleum Organization"]

[Text] "Cayman Islands" is a new center where Kuwaiti investors are becoming established. The center is distant, marginal, scarcely showing on the map, and lacking fame in most circles, but it is well-known among international and Arab businessmen and investors who have connections with international investments.

In the Cayman Islands, Kuwaiti interests purchased 25.57 percent of the shares of the ("ATOC Petroleum" Company). This share was owned by the ("John King Komayrtiz") Company, 10.67 percent; Mazhar Husayn, 7.45 percent; and Hasan Muhammad Zayid, 7.45 percent.

This share doubled Kuwaiti interests in the "ATOC Petroleum" Company, since the International Financing and Investment Company had previously purchased 25 percent of the shares which had belonged to Pakistani interests.

It is well-known that the International Financing and Investment Company was established a year ago with Kuwaiti-Saudi capital and adopted the Cayman Islands as its headquarters.

Unknown Islands

The Cayman Islands lie south of Cuba and northwest of Jamaica, and are a British territory. They include three islands of 93 square miles with about 15,000 inhabitants. The largest island is Grand Cayman.

In 1970 Cayman was converted to a free port and then to an ("off tours" zone) for banks and companies.

The Cayman Islands have succeeded, as have the Bahamas, the Isle of Man, Bermuda and other islands belonging to Britain, in attracting dozens of banks and investment and commercial companies. They are becoming an important center to which companies go to escape from taxes levied by their governments.

Despite the tax exemptions which the companies enjoy, they still have become the most important source of income for the natives and local governments of these islands.

The companies attract large numbers of employees and administrators, not to mention employing large numbers of citizens at large salaries and increasing consumer spending potential.

The presence of the companies and banks has led to the establishment of service companies to work on roads, housing, office design, and extending telephone, Telex, information and propaganda networks, etc. Thus the local authorities are relieved of financing this work.

The presence of companies, banks and service companies has attracted international tourism investors who have built hotels, resorts and conference centers, and they have made available means of relaxation for businessmen on permanent or temporary business or visiting as tourists.

Oil Investments

It is worth mentioning that the Kuwaiti investment in the "ATOC Petroleum" Company is not the first in the oil industry, because Arab interests are indeed concerned with increasing the size of their investment in the petroleum sector.

One of the most important deals in this field was the establishment of the Arab ("Sea Oil Corporation") with the purchase of a share from the Commonwealth Company operating in Puerto Rico.

Arab investments in this field amounted to 50 million dollars.

Also, last April a Lebanese millionaire obtained an important share of stock in the "Total Swiss" Company, which owns 370 gas stations in Switzerland.

Last August an Arab group submitted an offer to purchase 38 gas stations in London for 50 million pounds sterling. The stations belong to the British government, and the offer is still under consideration.

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BRIEFS

SWEDISH LOAN — The Kuwaiti International Investment Company announced yesterday that it is participating in the administration of an issue worth 100 million German marks for the benefit of the Swedish Export Financing Organization. A spokesman for the company said that the period of the issue is 7 years, maturing in 1987, and the average life of the issue is 5 1/2 years. The interest rate is 9 1/2 percent and the price of the issue is 100.5 percent. It will be entered on the Luxembourg stock exchange. The issue is led by the Westdeutsch Landesbank-Girozentrale. Several international banks are administering the issue. The Kuwaiti International Investment Company is the only Arab organization participating. [Text] [Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 1 Dec 80 p 6] 7587

HOLDING COMPANY -- Three Kuwaiti banks are participating in establishing the (Pearl) Holding Luxembourg Company, a company aimed at establishing and owning international banks in addition to working in fields of international investment. The [three] Kuwaiti banks—the National, Commercial and Real Estate Banks—own 60 percent of the 25 million dollar capital of the company. The remaining 40 percent belongs to the Pearl Investment Company. It is worth mentioning that the first result of the holding company's activity is the establishment of the Kuwaiti-French Bank with capital of a million francs. Its headquarters are in Paris; the Kuwaitis own 80 percent of the capital, and the remaining 20 percent is held by the French Commercial-Industrial Bank. It has been observed during recent months that a number of Gulf investors are turning to diversified investment in the French market in light of measures taken by financial and monetary authorities there to facilitate [investment]. [Text] [Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 27 Nov 80 p 13] 7587

FRENCH-ARAB BANK UNION -- Most Arab banking groups in the French capital expect to achieve a higher profit rate this year. The largest of these banks, the Union of French and Arab Banks (UBAF), which includes a number of Arab central banks and French banks such as Credit Lyonnais, announced that its profits for 1980 will exceed its profits for 1979 by 40 to 50 percent, or 7 million dollars. Another group, which includes the Arab International Bank for Investment and whose list of shareholders is headed by the Banque Nationale de Paris, announced that its profits this year will exceed last year's by 4 million dollars. UBAF concentrates its activities on offering European loans and financing French-Arab commerce, while the Arab International Bank for Investment takes care of advanced commercial banking services in addition to investments related to joint projects and financial administration. The two banks are considered part of steadily increasing banking activity in the French capital with the participation of banks in the Mediterranean countries, lebanese banks, private Arab banks, and some branches of Arab national banks. Arab investments in France are concerned with real estate, and Kuwait is in the forefront of those involved in these transactions. [Text] [Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 28 Nov 80 p 7] 7587

CSO: 4802

ROLE OF UNIFIL IN COUNTRY QUESTIONED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 15-21 Dec 80 pp 14-15

[Article by Rafiq Shalala: "Lebanese Affairs: The South; UN Forces from One Extension to Another; Their Success Lies in Revival of Truce Committee"]

[Text] The UN Security Council will meet next Thursday to look into the situation of the UN forces in South Lebanon and to extend their term from 19 December [of this year] to 19 June 1981. As usual UN Secretary General Dr Kurt Waldheim will read a report that will include a field account of the troops' activity and the United Nation's position on their future in the light of the tasks for which they were made responsible.

Waldheim's report on "the development" of the UN forces' activity will not be filled with positive facts this time. The UN Secretariat General as well as Lebanon have come to believe that both the existence and the role of these troops, which had come to Lebanon in March 1978 to station themselves in places that were occupied or almost occupied by Israel, require reconsideration.

According to UN forces in Beirut and to official Lebanese agencies this requirement is due to the fact that the glow which surrounded the glitter of the UN role the day after the men with the blue hats arrived in South Lebanon has diminished to the point that these troops have "adjusted" more than they should have to the prevailing atmosphere in Lebanon in general and in the south in particular. Their enthusiasm has thus diminished, and the effort they are putting into their mission has declined. This fact has caused the UN forces to lose their military credibility which all armed forces must have so they can perform their role and contribute their abilities in various areas, not to mention that of forging the peace.

UN sources in Beirut are talking about a painful situation that the UN forces have been experiencing for almost a year. It has limited their effectiveness and their ability to take action in a positive manner. The halo that surrounded these troops has collapsed or has almost collapsed, and the active parties in the south are no longer intimidated by the troops; they are competing with each other to score points within their reach.

Haddad, the "Joint Troops", Israel

Chief among those are the armed men of the border strip who are led by Maj Sa'd Haddad and who are called by the UN forces the "de facto forces." Those troops have gone too far in their destruction of villages and centers that until some months ago were under the care of the UN forces. The number of these villages came to five, distributed among the three southern sectors: the eastern, the western and the central. These are Kunin, Bayt Yahun, Rashaf, al-Tayyibah and Balat.

These "destructive" operations usually took place within earshot and within the view of the UN forces, but the UN forces were not able to take action even to oppose them. The rare occasions on which the UN forces had taken action, they had done so in self-defense. These border operations were usually accompanied by propaganda and popular campaigns carried out by residents of the border villages. These campaigns cast doubts about the role and the effectiveness of the UN troops in preventing the infiltration of armed men into the villages of "Free Lebanon." It is this that tied the hands of the UN forces and made them incapable of confronting the civilians who usually accompanied the armed men when they came to the villages, as was the case in Bayt Yahun and Balat for example.

The armed men of "the joint forces"--the alliance between the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance--got into the habit of ignoring the roadblocks of the UN forces and infiltrating the areas that are controlled by Haddad. Sometimes they would even go to the borders [to carry out] operations against Israeli settlements. Hardly does a day go by without there being one or more infiltration operation some of which the UN forces are able to apprehend. The UN forces either overlook the other operations or they fail to apprehend them. Skirmishes between them and the armed men of "the joint forces" take place almost daily. In most cases the UN forces' command is forced to meet with liaison officers to solve a simple problem such as that of confiscating a gun, a code or a knife.

These relations that were produced by the nature of the simultaneous practices of "the joint forces" and the UN forces made respect for the UN forces break down. And here again the capability and the effectiveness of the UN forces were ignored.

Israel, however, which is the third basic party in the south, has disregarded the UN troops on more than one occasion and has entered villages that they control. It has blown up homes there and kidnapped residents under the pretext of looking for guerillas and their supporters. Although Tel Aviv tries in every operation it carries out inside South Lebanon to avoid friction with the UN forces, international and local circles in Beirut are convinced that Israel does not care about the reaction that the United Nations may have since its decision to ignore the recommendations of the international organization and its resolutions need no proof. Perhaps the most recent evidence of this lack of concern lies in

Israel's insistence on expelling the mayors of Hebron and Halhul, Messrs Fahd al-Qawasimah and Muhammad Milham.

In view of this trilateral situation the UN forces found themselves captive of their situation. The border militias were accusing them of being incapable of preventing the infiltration of armed men into the border villages. "The joint forces" were accusing them of collusion with the militias and with Israel to make the operations of blowing up [homes], kidnapping [residents] and forcing [others] to leave their homes easy. Israel pays no real attention to them despite the international consensus that they represent in South Lebanon. The mutual accusations and the inability of the UN forces to defend themselves have made their position a very weak and an unheeded position.

International sources in Beirut state that there is a general international feeling that this "scandal" must be brought to an end; that the disregard of the armed men in the south--regardless of which group they belong to--for the role of the UN troops must be checked; and that the military credibility of the UN troops must be restored before it is too late, that is, before these troops become incapable of regaining their prestige.

Increasing Effectiveness, not Number

Hence, the same sources add, the investigation is now concentrating--and this is what Waldheim will mention in his report next Thursday--on increasing the effectiveness of the UN forces and not increasing their number, which is now 6,020 men. This effort is attributable to the international conviction that as long as these troops are incapable of invading the road and reaching the Lebanese-Israeli borders as UN Security Council resolutions stipulated, they should at least strive to establish their presence and their strength in those areas which they are presently controlling.

The same sources add that there is a Lebanese and an international consensus about the necessity of restoring prestige to the troops and recognizing that some major countries may criticize the UN forces rather harshly during the debate about extending [their mandate]. What Lebanon fears is that these sharp debates may cause one of the superpowers to veto the extension, thereby making the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon illegal and the parties that stand to benefit from this situation would seize on the opportunity to take away "their shares."

International sources affirm, however, that no matter how harsh the criticism will be, it will not lead to a veto, but will rather embarrass the UN secretary general who is considered the commander of these troops. He is the man who is responsible for their conduct and the one who reaps the negative as well as the positive results of that conduct. Therefore, Waldheim will be clear in his report: he will not discuss "progress" in the work of these troops, but he will rather discuss their retreat

whose reasons he will explain clearly and candidly, placing the responsibility squarely in front of everyone [concerned].

Perhaps foremost among these responsibilities is that of the narrow and limited framework in which the international organization placed these troops after an agreement was reached to send them to Lebanon. There is no international resolution to give the troops a free hand to defend themselves and those territories where they are scattered. This is proof that the presence of the UN forces is no more than an extension of a mysterious reality that the entire Arab area is experiencing while it waits for a permanent solution to be found to the Middle East crisis, and its central episode, the question of Palestine. Hence, action by the UN forces appears limited and the United Nation's political decision appears weak and mysterious because they are derived from a situation that is mysterious too.

But the delay in finding a comprehensive solution to the crisis of the area should not necessarily mean that the situation in the south remain as it is. Nor should it mean that the "decline" of the UN forces' role is to continue gradually in a manner that would take them out of consideration altogether.

Therefore, after the next extension [of the mandate] for the troops, the United Nations will take action in two directions: the first is military and the second is diplomatic.

The first action will manifest itself in more firmness in the area of international operations; in an effort to regain the points that the UN troops had gradually lost to Haddad's troops; and in giving the UN troops a free hand to oppose the infiltration operations and the other usurpation attempts regardless of the direction fror which they come. This would be done by strengthening the forces that are located in sensitive locations on the contact lines with Haddad's troops and giving them clear instructions that define their role and are consistent with their capabilities.

On the diplomatic side action will consist of a series of international, Arab and regional political contacts that would be carried out by the secretariat general and by other agencies for the purpose of persuading the concerned parties in the south to cease presuming upon the UN forces and to force them to cooperate with those forces in accordance with the repeated resolutions of the Security Council. Perhaps the most salient of these contacts will be [conducted] with Israel and the PLO since they are most capable of controlling the situation and establishing an undeclared "truce" in the south so that residents of South Lebanon can live in peace as they wait for a solution to the pending problems chief among which is the question of the Middle East.

The function of the UN forces in the next 6 months may be summarized under four headings: firmness in treatment; steadfastness in the

positions; self-defense and more when necessary; and use of diplomatic action.

There is nothing at the present time to indicate that the UN forces have or are capable of having anything but those attributes which could yield tangible results if applied effectively.

It may be that the suggestions which Waldheim will include in his report will deal with the necessity of reaching more cooperation with the parties concerned along with continuing to study the means of strengthening these forces and increasing their efficiency.

But the question about Lebanon's role in securing the UN forces still remains.

The fact is that Lebanon which had sent two battalions of its army to the south--the first stopped at Kawkaba and did not arrive at Tibnin as had been determined, and the second stopped at Arzun and dispersed in the UN operations area--is not able at the present time to send more regular Lebanese forces. It is enough that it was able to make a small increase in the number of those who were there. The internal situation in Lebanon and the shake-up to which the army establishment was subjected after the incidents of 'Ayn al-Rummanah, as well as those incidents that occurred simultaneously with them, limited the state's ability to deal with the crisis of the south within Lebanon. The state's role was confined to dealing with the crisis on an international level. This leads one to raise a painful question that may be summarized in [the statement] that the UN forces, which represent major and effective countries, are incapable of performing their role effectively and successfully. There are those who are not intimidated by them. How then can the Lebanese army be effective when its leaders and members have been presumed upon and told what to do by every armed man or party faction?

Accordingly, the Lebanese role in South Lebanon in the next stage will be a diplomatic role that will be followed by a limited and a symbolic military role. The Lebanese role will be that of an observer who is moved and affected by events, but who does not influence them. The recent meeting that was held to revive the Lebanese-Israeli Truce Committee affirmed that Lebanon could do no more than offer observations and remonstrations to Israel's conduct. Meanwhile, the representatives of the Israeli side listened and ignored [what was being said], affirming that what had taken place was a Lebanese-Israeli military meeting and not [a meeting of] the truce committee. Therefore, the earnestness of the international role in the south will begin with the success in reviving the truce committee officially with Israel's recognition. If this takes place, the UN forces may be given new roles to implement the resolutions and the recommendations of the truce committee. But if this does not take place, then Lebanon will be facing one extension for the UN troops after another until such a day when the representative of a superpower will raise his finger in the Security Council to declare his rejection of the extension. The UN resolution would then fail, and so would South Lebanon.

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CSO: 4802

LEBANESE FRONT'S HISTORIC DOCUMENT ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22-28 Dec 80 pp 12-13

[Article by May Kahalah: "Lebanese Affairs: The Accord: 'From the Perspective of Coming Together, not from the Position of Coming to Blows;' The Document of the Lebanese Front Rejects the 1943 Pact; a New Draft Constitution"]

[Text] On the 23rd of this December the Lebanese Front is to announce its new document which it considers historic and which it is guarding with considerable secrecy. It seems that this document will become a basic turning point in the political proposal that the front is pursuing on the threshold of the eighties. It may become the front's new constitution.

The importance of this document is undoubtedly related to the success of the measures to unite the military forces of all the parties of which these troops are made of. These measures had been announced last November 19. On this basis it became possible for the military troops to face all the Lebanese factions from a position of strength after conflicts had brought them close to ruin and almost dissipated their strength.

People close to the front are saying that for the first time the new document will present alternatives to the 1943 Pact that are possible. It will approach the parties on the Lebanese scene from the perspective of coming together and not from the position of coming to blows.

Because the secrecy surrounding the clauses of the statement is still in control of the situation, the little information that has been filtered so far indicates that the proposed foundations [of that statement] differ from what was mentioned in the declarations of (Sayiddah al-Bayr), Zgharta and Ihdin in that the new statement is clearer about what is required and addresses itself directly to solutions without explaining the conditions that make them necessary. Those who have been keeping up with the progress of the front think that the new statement does not deviate from the plan of action that the front had outlined for itself ever since it came into existence. This new statement is rather a natural continuation of the development of events; it complements the changes that were produced by the war--changes which must be acknowledged.

What then is in the statement?

For the first time the front will publicly announce its doubts about the 1943 Pact which is responsible for the partisanship and the fighting in which Lebanon finds itself today. The front will call upon all Lebanese groups to reconsider the pact and to change it through decentralization, a federation or a confederation.

The front would thereby have settled a dispute that has gone on for a long time, especially among its members. This is because in his "conciliatory" television encounter with Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam early this month Phalangist leader, al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil had referred to the fact that the pact could be upheld and that the rising generation had to rely on it to achieve new solutions. It seems that the young leaders in the parties of the front became inclined to probe deeper; previously there had been a race to announce the need "to drop" the pact and to adopt a genuine reorganization of the political system.

The front will also define the pillars of Lebanese survival with which a person preserves his dignity and his freedom. It will address itself directly to the outside world, especially both parts of the foreign world: the western part--western Europe and the United States; and the eastern part--the Soviet Union. This address will be directed to the government and to the people, and it will discuss the Lebanese question in depth as well as the need to deal with it promptly.

Equal Rights

We must refer here to the fact that the front will not depart from underscoring two matters. The first is the right of minorities, regardless of their religion, their sect and their number, to have equal rights with the members of the remaining sects. The second is the front's determination to cooperate with all Lebanese parties to bring the new Lebanon into existence. In this regard energetic and successive contacts are being made with some of those who were adversaries in the past. Everyone has guarded those contacts with secrecy, but they will yield positive results with regard to stirring the conditions of some groups in areas where they constitute a minority.

The front will not forget to mention the division that is taking place within the Maronite rank and its negative results on political action. It will deal with it, however, as an "[ill] wind" that is blowing on the Maronites: when dangers return to threaten the homeland, everybody will come together to defend Lebanon and to dress its wounds.

Those in the know think it likely that the new statement will turn into a new "constitution" for the front as it enters the eighties and [prepares for] a new presidential term in less than 2 years. The significance of the statement lies in the fact that the jolts to which the front was subjected did not do away with the front as an active force, determined to survive.

This statement is considered the actual expression of the front's will to survive beyond the parties and the movements whose interaction with each other will inevitably continue to be negative or positive without affecting the strength of the front and the principles for which it is struggling.

Deterrence and Settlement

The statement will also deal with the Palestinian presence and with the condition of the deterrent forces. It will reiterate the front's rejection of settlement and partition.

People close to the front are saying that all the members are unanimous in their support for the spirit, the foundation and the declarations of the statement. This consensus had come about in lengthy sessions of debate, exchange of ideas and analysis until front members did come to [an agreement about] a final text for the document which was drafted by Messrs Charles Malik, Fu'ad Afram al-Bustani and Edouard Hanin.

One question does remain: will this document become a constitution for the front?

There are those who say that the document may become a basic starting point for cooperation with the remaining factions because it contains numerous positive points and because it leaves the doors open to an in-depth dialogue. Furthermore, after the military forces of the front are united and the front proclaims this document, it will thereafter determine a unified position by which all the parties that come under its wing will abide. This is with regard to giving the governments that will be formed a vote of confidence and with regard to an agreement on the 1982 presidential candidate. It is this that is turning this document into a political center of what the front's movement may represent in a united word vis a vis opposing movements. And this is one thing that has hitherto been unavailable.

8592
CSO: 4802

KING FAISAL UNIVERSITY'S ROLE REVIEWED

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English 2 Jan 81 pp 20-21, 23-24

[Text] THE CEREMONY HELD LAST June at the King Faisal University (KFU) main campus in Al-Hasa did more than simply send the university's first graduates out into world. It had been the personal dream of King Faisal to see a university established in the oasis to contribute to the development of the region. And those first 42 graduates, with degrees in agriculture, architecture, planning, veterinary medicine and animal husbandry, represented the culmination of that dream.

KFU opened its doors in 1975 at its Dammam site, a five-million-square-meter plot donated by the Ministry of Defence and Aviation, and later at Al-Hasa on an equal-sized parcel. Initial plans for the university called for a college of medicine and medical sciences and a college of architecture and planning to be established at the Dammam branch. A college of agriculture sciences and foods and a college of veterinary medicine and animal wealth commenced in Al-Hasa. The first year's enrollment for the two campuses was 175.

Now in its sixth architecture operating year, KFU is enhancing its reputation steadily. Far beyond expectations, enrollment has climbed to 1,500. The college of architecture had to turn away 300 applicants this year. The 1,000 medical and architectural students at the Dammam have saturated that campus. "We'll keep it at that number for probably some time," says Dr. Muhammed S. Kahtani.

Kahtani has been associated with the university since its founding, and during the past three years as its rector. Despite a host of challenges, he maintains, the university is able to maintain academic standards.

"From what I hear, we are on the right track. In medicine, we get a chance to hear opinions of a lot of visiting experts. They are very sincere. They praise the medical curriculum and the academic standards in the classes, laboratories, and hospital."

Kahtani reports that his medical students who are doing clinical work at hospitals in Bahrain and Riyadh have received high praise. "But we are still anxious to improve," he says.

"In architecture we are doing well," he notes. "Student enrollment is a good indication of that." Veterinary medicine and agriculture are doing equally well, he says.

The challenges to be overcome in order to maintain those standards are formidable. The newness of the university has meant that present operations must be carried out in temporary buildings. The administration building in Dammam is a remodeled 25-year-old naval hospital. The university has rented buildings off-campus for its student and faculty housing.

The fact that the university is divided in two adds a strain to the administration. Dr. Kahtani spends two days a week at the Al-Hasa campus, a three-hour drive from Dammam.

Then there is the perennial problem in Saudi Arabia, that of employee turnover. The number of KFU's faculty that leave the university every year is estimated to range from 25 to 50 per cent. Many of these are simply returning to a position elsewhere from which they had

taken a year's leave of absence to teach at KFU.

"But some come here secretly expecting to make a business contact and become fabulously wealthy," one professor laughs. "It never seems to work out that way." For whatever their reason, those who depart KFU pose a serious problem. Especially in the College of Medicine there is often only one professor qualified to teach a particular subject — if he leaves and can't immediately be replaced, a course may have to be postponed. This can result in students being forced to take courses out of sequence.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge of all is that many classes are taught in a language that is foreign to both the students and teachers. Many classes are taught in English, and KFU accordingly has a required program to teach students the language. But one professor expresses sympathy for the students, who are exposed to a bewildering variety of accents from the highly-international faculty. "They are studying under a great handicap."

As important to the university as its academic standard is adherence to Islamic values. Men and women are segregated as much as possible, and the Islamic dress code maintained. "Students, faculty and administration should be responsible for maintaining Islamic standards," says Ali Kreedy, a sixth year medical student from Qassim. As student representative on the university's library committee, Kreedy directed the staff to cancel subscriptions to *Smithsonian*, *Scientific American*, and *Natural History*, since those magazines contained advertisements for alcoholic beverages. (These ads would normally have been removed by the Ministry of Information except that as a government agency, KFU receives its mail uncensored.) Kreedy feels that any material of value those periodicals might have contained will be found in the more than 500 others to which the library subscribes.

But maintenance of Islamic standards doesn't preclude information about other cultures. An architecture professor noted that his course in Medieval European architecture dealt largely with Christian churches and the religious beliefs that inspired their design. "The students seemed genuinely interested," he says.

Among the students generally is a spirit of eagerness, competitiveness and enjoyment. Many speak of their desire to enter private or government practice in their fields. A fourth year medical students from Salwa, explaining why he wanted to return there to set up his practice, says simply, "It's my community and I like it there."

When classes end in the afternoon the students leave, but many of the faculty and administration stay on, working until nine p.m. or later. Despite the relative youth of the university, KFU faculty participate widely in academic symposiums and conferences. The extra hours they spend preparing papers to present at such gatherings contribute to the growing reputation of the university.

Among the administration, most of the overtime hours go into preparing the university's master plan for a permanent campus. Though still in an early stage, the master plan is taking shape on the consultants' drawing boards portend a campus that will rival any in the world in quality.

To begin with, there is not simply one master plan, but two. An American-Saudi architectural engineering firm known as TAC, DMJM, DSG has produced a 20-year master plan for Al-Hasa main campus, and work is proceeding on the detailed drawings of buildings. Tenders are scheduled to go out next June.

The early phase of construction, lasting probably a decade, will include the administration building, agriculture college, veterinary medicine, and a new college of education. There will be a separate facility for a women's college of home economics, which now exists in Al-Hasa on a small scale.

The only facilities to be shared by men and women will be the mosque and library, and in these provisions have been made to insure segregation. Women will have a separate entrance to the mosque and will only use the balcony. They will have a system whereby female students can request a book and have it to them.

Student and faculty housing will be constructed in the early phase of the

Al-Hasa master plan, during which the enrollment at the campus is expected to reach almost 2,000. Total building space will pass 125,000 square meters, with about one-third of that as housing.

The Al-Hasa campus promises to be spectacular, with covered concourses, canals, reflecting pools, and an abundance of trees. During the second decade of the master plan, more faculty housing will be added, and possibly a college of management.

The master plan for the KFU-Dammam branch is in the hands of a French-Saudi consulting firm, ACP-OTH-OSA. Work has not progressed as far on it as on the Al-Hasa document. The consultants are preparing to present five general concepts to the KFU administration, which it will review. One concept will be chosen, which will be turned into a specific master plan.

Obviously, few details have emerged for certain about the Dammam campus at this point. But it is clear that the university intends to extend its seaside location 1,500 meters out into the Gulf through landfill. The site is expected to have a teaching hospital, and may also add a College of Applied Sciences and a College of Humanities and Islamic studies. All plans are subject to review at the ministerial level, thus some plans may be altered or abandoned later, administration planners say.

While the implementation of the master plan will be an enormous boon to the university, some projects have been too important to keep waiting. Most notably, KFU is constructing a veterinary hospital at a second Al-Hasa site known as the "Training and Research Station for Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine." The two-by-three-kilometer site was obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture. The veterinary hospital itself, due to be completed in January by Korea's Samick at cost of SR80 million, will occupy 20,000 square meters of that, with an actual 8,000 square meters of floorspace.

The hospital includes classrooms, offices, laboratories and animal housing. Under its contract, Samick is providing all the medical equipment, which it is purchasing from a San Francisco supplier.

At the Dammam campus, Yamama Est. has nearly completed a new cafeteria and a college of medicine extension building, the latter at a cost of SR28 million. Samick is also hard at work on housing for staff.

The Ministry of Health has also helped out KFU by loaning it the new Al-Khobar hospital, built by Phillip-Holzman of Germany as part of the Ministry's five hospitals project. KFU was granted the hospital to use for teaching purposes for five years, which it will administer out of its own budget SR530 million this year).

Opening the hospital has been delayed due to a six-month delay in receiving block visas for staff and other recruiting difficulties. But the university is proceeding to use the hospital by orienting students to it and holding some classes there. For the staff which has been recruited but has nothing to do until the hospital opens, Arabic or English classes will be held as appropriate, according to Ali Ahmed, Hospital Director. These will begin in January, he says. He refused to say when the hospital might open, other than "as soon as possible".

KFU, as any visitor can see, has come a long way in five years. And it has to a long way to go if it is to become the world-class university it aspires to be. Evidently the enthusiasm of the administration and faculty are equal to the tasks ahead. "This is the second hottest spot in the Eastern Province after Jubail," one says. Adds another, "things here get better and better every year. My work is very satisfying." ●

RIYADH UNIVERSITY'S large new campus in the northern outskirts of the capital on the Diriyah road is finally to receive its academic core. Its long-negotiated $1.7 billion construction contract was signed earlier this month.

The contract, was originally billed as the world's largest when international bids for thrice this value went in two years ago. It has gone to the original low bidder, a $5:45 U.S.-French joint venture led by Bouygues of Paris with Blount International of Montgomery, Alabama.

Several months remain before the mammoth 40 month turnkey job can begin, according to a Bouygues spokesman in Riyadh. The lengthy, technical English language contract must first be translated into a final Arabic version.

While infrastructural work and housing has long gone onto what will probably still be the w... largest single university campus, negotiations were extended on the academic core as the scale of the job was pared down (see *Saudi Business* III 49, March 7, 1980).

The campus, originally designed for 25,000 students by a U.S.-British consortium Hok14, is now intended for 15,000 students as the Kingdom's educational planners have come to stress more vocational and less academic training.

Officials also believed unit construction costs in the Kingdom had declined since the time the original bids were drawn up.

Construction management has yet to be awarded, according to Bougues' spokesman. It will probably go to the design team. Final drawings and specifications for the scaled-down core, including academic schools and administration blocks, were only completed this summer, he said.

Much of the construction will be with pre-cast elements to be manufactured on site by an existing, university-owned facility used in other campus elements. According to Bouygues, original plans called for a massive peak workforce of 15,000, some 6,000 more than at Jubail. This too will be probably proportionally pared down.

CSO: 4820

PROGRESS, FUTURE OF JUBAYL PROJECT ASSESSED

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English 23 Jan 81 pp 18-19, 22-24

[Text] THERE COMES A TIME IN any project when money, no matter how abundant, is no longer enough to keep it moving. According to officials of Bechtel and the Royal Commission, that time is fast arriving at Jubail.

It is the human factor, that most variable of variables, that is increasingly going into play at Jubail. Observers of the gargantuan project — to construct an industrial city and residential community of 370,000 from scratch in only 25 years — are convinced that the next five years will be crucial in determining whether Jubail succeeds or fails.

Foremost among the imponderables in Jubail's future is security. Abadan is a smoking ruins a few hundred miles to the north. The Gulf is the focal point not only of regional conflict but of potential superpower conflict, and one that many fear is much more likely to occur with the United States led by a hawkish Reagan administration.

And right at the edge of the Gulf is Jubail.

"I don't really believe Jubail would be a target in a Gulf war. We're not developed enough." A consultant says. "But it does cross my mind once in a while."

A second intangible is the viability of the export industries now being erected at the site. Already two of every three industries originally scheduled for Jubail have been shelved or cancelled. Others are in doubt.

"We're not interested in just building another export refinery, an Exxon official commented about a proposed joint venture with Petromin. "It's got to make good economic sense for Saudi Arabia. It's got to fit in with the products he world needs from this area."

"Every projection we've done in the past few years has been way high or way low," one oil company executive remarked. "It's just getting too hard to predict if these things will be viable." But he added, "the ones that are going ahead at Jubail, I think they will succeed."

Most elusive of all the questions that will be facing Jubail during the Third Five Year Plan is manpower. Not the construction requirement for foreign labor, which is expected to peak during the mid-1980s at about 30,000. But Saudis and their families who will wrest themselves away from their traditional communities and take a chance on Jubail. Is any incentive really great enough to make them do that?

"I think they'll come," says an official of one of the primary industries. "Look at our training sessions. We get 10 times the applicants as we have places for." Nevertheless, the numbers of trainees needed is going to increase 50-fold from the 20 that are trained at present.

What is perhaps most encouraging about the next five years is that the Royal Commission and Bechtel have proved themselves capable of doing their part. The goal of the Royal Commission, under the Third Five Year Plan, is to complete the industrial and community infrastructure that are required by the public and private sector for energy, industrial and commercial projects. That work is proceeding with $7 billion

already spent this year and another $14 billion allocated, according to Dr. Jameel Al-Jishi, director general of the Royal Commission for Jubail.

In its original state, the 160 square kilometer project site was nearly impassable, due to soft sand and wet sabkha. The Royal Commission awarded its first site preparation contract in 1977. Since then, 86 million cubic meters of earth have been moved. Bechtel reckons that the earth moved during the project would be enough to build an embankment one meter high and 21 meter across that would circumscribe the earth. At the peak of activity, 2,000 people and 1,000 pieces of major equipment were dedicated to the task of transporting compacting and grading the soil.

At present 65 square kilometers or 83 per cent of the industrial area has been prepared. In the community area, eight square kilometers, 10 per cent, has been prepared. During the next five years all 80 square kilometers of the industrial area will have been prepared, and 30 square kilometers of community area.

Roadbuilding followed closely on the heels of site preparation, with the first contract being awarded in August 1977. During the Second Five Year Plan, 4.7 kilometers of expressways and 62.9 kilometers of feeder roads were built at a cost of SR400 million. All roads are being built complete with drainage, lighting, signalling, landscaping, signing and all safety requirements. Some roads were built initially without these accessories in order to expedite construction. They will be rebuilt under future contracts. Traffic, mainly construction-related, is heavy. Along some haul routes up to 400 vehicles per hour have been counted on one direction.

Construction will begin soon on Jubail's first freeway. During the next five years, 23 kilometers of freeway will be completed, along with 49 kilometers of expressways and 75 kilometers of feeder roads. The total planned over the entire, 20 year span of development is 171,67, and 791 kilometers respectively. That includes 580 kilometers of roads built in Al-Mantekah Al Sakaniyah, the eight district residential section of the project. Twenty-four cloverleaf interchanges will help keep traffic flowing smoothly.

The construction crews at Jubail relied on ground water purified by reverse osmosis for their initial supply. That source provides 15,200 cubic meters per day. Another 19,00 meters per day became available when the SR126 million barge-mounted desalination plant built by Hitachi Zozen started operations in February 1980. The total present supply far exceeds the demand, 12,000 cubic meters per day.

The ultimate demand for freshwater from the permanent community is expected to reach 550,000 cubic meters per day. By the end of 1985, fresh water from SWCC will be available totalling 230,000 cubic meters per day. That includes two 19,200-tons per day plants that are due onstream by September 1982. The desalination plants are being built by a consortium of Mistui Engineering and Shipbuilding and Mitsui Co. of Japan, and Shin Han Engineering of South Korea for SR 250 million.

To distribute the potable water, 66 kilometers of conveyance lines were installed during the Second Five Year Plan, with 37,000 cubic meters of storage. By the end of the Third Plan, the distribution system in the industrial area will be complete and in operation as well as facilities to serve two community districts.

The present sewage load of 5,000 cubic meters per day is collected in a network of 20 kilometers of pipe and treated in the 6,100 cubic meter capacity plant. The next five years will see a permanent sanitary wastewater treatment plant with a 36,000 cubic-meter capacity come on stream. The 31,000 cubic meter per day industrial wastewater treatment plant will be functioning as well. The industrial area collection system and the primary and secondary collection systems for two sections of the permanent community will be complete. The ultimate sewage load in 20 years time is expected to reach 250,000 cubic meters per day. Treated effluent will be used for irrigation.

The initial system for disposing of solid waste (trash and junk) was built

and began operations during the Second Plan. Solid waste is disposed of at Jubail by dumping it in engineered sanitary landfills. There it is compacted and buried. At present 12,000 tons per year of solid waste is being generated. That is expected to rise to 750,000 tons per year in two decades.

The design of the electrical distribution system for Jubail is being done by two entities. SCECO is designing the primary high voltage system, including all feeders to the primary industries — the Royal Commission's Architect/ Engineers Black and Veatch Arabia are designing the infrastructure distribution system within the industrial area and all of the distribution system within the community.

So far, 165 kilometers of the circuit distribution system has been installed. SCECO will finish constructing four major substations during 1981. During the coming five years, SCECO will install 488 circuit kilometers of distribution system. The Royal Commission will install 585 kilometers of infrastructure distribution system and 250 kilometers of the community distribution system. All of the distribution system installed by the Royal Commission comes from its budget. However, this will eventually be bought back by SCECO.

The supply of electricity by the end of the Third Plan will be 3,000 MW, far in excess of the 30 MW now demanded. In 20 years the supply will be 6,000 MW, equalling the anticipated demand. At that time, the community is expected to need 1700 MW, with the rest going to the industrial area.

Communications at Jubail are handled by a 1,600 — line pabx system, a 264-channel microwave link to the Ministry of PTT's facilities in Dammam and a six-channel microwave system for mobile use within the project area for fire protection, security, etc. During the Third Plan, a 3,000-line transportable central office will be installed that will work in conjunction with the 1,600 pabx system. Additionally, two permanent nt central offices will provide 10,000 lines (expandable to 20,000) in the industrial area. A 20,000 – line central office will be established in the community. Capacity for 189,000 lines will be installed by the year 2000.

The commercial and industrial ports were 70 per cent completed during the last five years in contracts worth an estimated SR15 billion, paid for by the Saudi Ports Authority. The contracts included work in dredging, filling, wave protection, quay construction, and infrastructure. A petrochemical quay and tank farm should already have been completed. The Royal Commission gave the ports authority designs and money from its own budget to carry out the project. When nothing was done, the Royal Commission had to intercede at the ministerial level to recover the funds. Now it is embarked on a crash program to get those facilities built.

The commercial port has 16 quays, including two for containers and two for ro-ro. International port managers of Singapore received a $40 million contract last November to manage the port for three years.

All primary and some secondary industries will be served by a seawater cooling system. In other parts of the world industries requiring cooling are located next to rivers where they pump the water they need directly. The nature of Jubail and the high concentration of industrial development required that the Royal Commission build a body of water adjacent to the industries, in the form of a 10-mile long canal.

Design work was finished by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners last July. The system includes a dredged intake channel, a pumphouse an onshore canal system, supply and return pipes to the industries, and gravity discharge to the sea. When the system begins operating, during the Third Plan, it will have a capcity to move 9.8 million cubic meters per day. The water discharged will be a maximum of 10 degrees centigrade higher than ambient conditions. This won't disrupt the environment.

The final piece of infrastructure serving all the industries will be the distribution system for the gas feedstock and fuel. Aramco, through McDermott Engineering of Houston, is designing the system for Petromin. The initial system will serve the first seven industries to be

established, with a second phase being added to serve additional industries. The demand for gas of all the primary industries is expected to total 1,393,000 cubic meters per hour.

Each industry will have a meter that will send information back to Aramco headquarters in Dhahran via shortwave. For ethane, which remains constant in content, a simple flowmeter will be used.

For methane, which may be enriched occasionally by NGI that Armaco can't sell or store, a flow meter and sampler will be used. Thus ethane users will be billed on a straight volume basis, while methane users will be billed on a btu basis. ●

Support Industries Opportunities

CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS PLANT:

Readymix concere (3)
Asphaltic concrete (2)
Precast concrete products (2)
Prebent reinforcing steel and wire mesh products (1)
Materials testing laboratory (2)
Drywall products manufacturing (0)
Pipes manufacturing (1)
Precast pipes -- concerete, asbestos cement and fiberglass reinforced plastic (1)

BULK SUPPLY MATERIALS:

Concrete aggregate (0)
Asphalt concrete aggregate (0)
Formwork, materials, scaffolding and lumber (1)
Metal, plastic and clay piping and fittings (0)
Cement (0)
Crushed road-base materials (0)
Petroleum, oil and lubricants distributions center (0)

SALES AND SERVICE SHOPS:

Automotive maintenance shop (1)
Heavy truck and hauling equipment shop (0)
Heavy construction and lifting equipment shop (0)
Major engine overhaul shop (0)
Electrical shop for fabrication and repair (0)
Electronic, instrument and telecommunication equipment fabrication and repair (0)
Refrigerator/air conditioning sales, fabrication and maintenance (2)
Machine shop including welding and fabrication (1)
Rigging shop (1)
Sheet metal work including ducting (0)
Plumbing and pipefitting shop (2)
Industrial and household moving and storage (0)
Welding and flame cutting equipment and supplies (1)
Truck tire sales and repair (1)
Steel fabrication (1)
Structural and miscellaneous steel fabrication (2)
Process steelwork and piping, fabrication and maintenance (0)

PROCESS PLANT:

Pressure vessels, heat exchangers fabrication and maintenance (1)
Construction equipment dealer, sales and service (4)
Builder hardware, sales and service (0)
Cladding and roofing shop (0)
Doors, windows and joinery products (0)
Steel building manufacturers (1)
Commercial plastic products manufacturer (0)
Manufactured homes/commercial building (0)
Construction equipment leasing (3)
Commercial fiberglass product manufacturing sales and service (1)
Automobile dealer, sales and service (0)
Radiator repair and service shop (1)

INDUSTRY SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS:

Printing equipment and paper products (0)
Office furniture (0)
Print shop (2)
Fire pre[illegible]pment (0)
Industri[illegible] (0)
Office supplie[illegible]
Office building, with parking (0)
Kitchen equipment, household/commercial (0)
Commercial laundry/dry cleaning plant (1)

Fuel dispensing and service stations, heavy duty and automotive (2)
Commercial ice manufacturing and delivery (1)
Commercial nursery (0)
Film progressive laboratory and commercial photographic sales and service (0)
Commercial sign and sign-writing service (0)
Data processing service (0)
Automatic car wash facility (0)
Aersonal canning and filling plants (0)
Commercial office building (0)
Commercial centers (0)
Security services (1)

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATIONS:
Bus transportation center and repair shops (0)
Truck transportation and cargo distribution center (0)
Truck transit hostel (0)
Public weighbridge for trucks (0)

WHOLESALERS AND JOBBERS FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION:
Paint and industrial coatings distribution (0)
Electricial materials distribution (2)
Industrial and commercial chemicals distribution (0)
Industrial and commercial gases distribution (1)
Food processing and distribution, dry, chill, and freeze (2)
Industrial and commercial repair, parts and tools, including piping, tubing and valves (0)
Suspended ceilings sales and installation (0)
Bathroom fittings and fixtures distribution (0)
Wall and floor tiles and related products, distribution (0)
Thermal insulation sales and installation (0)
Domestic plumbing equipment and supplies distribution (0)
Commercial plumbing equipment and supplies distribution (0)
Commercial and industrial glass sales and glazing (0)
Manufacturing and assembly plants:
Vehicle assembly plant (0)
Process heater manufacture and assembly plant (0)
Furniture manufacture (0)

As of October, The Royal Commission says that business categories are constantly being added to this list. The fact that a particular business isn't listed shouldn't discourage an interested party from submitting an application. In cases where selections in a particular category have been made which satisfy present demand, the Royal Commission will continue to accept applications in that category. As of January, the Royal Commission has received more than 500 applications.

Numbers refer to applications accepted

CSO: 4820

COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PROGRAM TO BE LAUNCHED

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 22 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Faruq Sulayman: "Health Conference Assesses Problems, Makes Plans for the Future"]

[Text] Sudan has adopted the World Health Organization's [WHO] motto: "Good health for everyone by the year 2000." This goal has become the cornerstone of Sudan's health program, which was presented by Health Minister Khalid 'Abbas Husayn to a health conference held on 15-20 November at Friendship Hall in Khartoum. Here are some of the points contained in the health minister's address to the conference.

The Ministry of Health aided by officials of the 5-year plan, the modified 5-year plan, the 6-year plan, as well as other private and official health organizations is planning to launch a major health care program aimed at ending the disparity in health services between the urban and rural sectors. "We are about to enter a new, revolutionary, constructive stage, one for which we have been well prepared by our 11 years of revolutionary experience, whose aim is to produce healthy, productive Sudanese people. Our successful and less than successful experiences of the past 11 years have prepared us well for this undertaking, which will continue until the year 2000. We must now make ready to move ahead vigorously to give the Sudanese people good health care, superior to any provided in the past 10 years. We present you today with our new, comprehensive, health development strategy, a strategy aimed at our people, our land, our water and our air. Our goal is to insure that each of us as well as future generations will, by the year 2000, enjoy good health and become productive members of society, capable of contributing to our economy and social progress. We are proposing a true 'health democracy.' We are proposing that good health becomes a revolutionary right of every citizen."

It should be noted that this theme has been emphasized earlier in an address given by President Gaafar Nimeiri on the opening day of parliament on 11 June 1980. In his address, the president told parliament that he not only supported the WHO's "health for everyone" motto, but that he was behind the comprehensive health program to be launched by the Ministry of Health in conjunction with other world health organizations. The president told parliament that the Ministry of Health had taken the first practical step in that direction at a meeting held in the town of Sinar on 14-22 April 1980. That meeting, he said, had resulted in the formulation of the health care program and ways to implement

it. The president called upon all governmental, political and public organizations to take part in the health program to make good health a reality for everyone by the year 2000.

Dr Shakir Mousa, the deputy health minister, then presented to the conference the preliminary outline of the proposed health plan and asked them to debate it and approve it.

In preparing for the health care plan, the health minister had already formed a committee, chaired by the deputy health minister and served by the heads of all Ministry of Health divisions and assistants for health affairs to the governors of the country's provinces. The task of that committee was to prepare the strategy for the health for everyone program. A major function of the committee was to gather information and other health statistics from all parts of the country.

Before we present the outline of the health strategy we must clarify the public understanding of the plan aimed at insuring good health for everyone by the year 2000. The strategy in question will, without a doubt, give every citizen a measure of good health, enabling him to live a productive life on the economic and social levels.

--The long range political program related to the health for everyone by the year 2000 strategy is part and parcel of the national economic and social policy.

Furthermore, the intermediate range health programs (5-6 years) are viewed as a complement to the national economic-social program. The planned health program is also viewed in this light.

To realize the goal of health for everyone by the year 2000, much attention must be given to the primary health care program and the improvements that have been added to it.

Decentralization on the national and regional levels makes it mandatory that health plans take into consideration each region's resources. The only requirement is that these plans remain within the framework of the national economic and social strategy. Otherwise, each region and locality should be free to pursue its own health program according to its resources. The role of the Ministry of Health should be to disseminate guidelines and guidance to the various local health groups. The limited health resources of the localities makes it necessary that health services be complementary [no duplication]. The key to the success of the health st-ategy lies in the establishment of a preventive medicine program. But this is not possible unless it is accompanied by a good treatment program within the reach of primary local health units. Public support and participation is also essential to success.

Official health statistics indicate that the Sudanese public is plagued by 10 principal diseases, whose impact could be limited by good, preventive health measures. These statistics also reveal that 140 per 1,000 infants die before they are 1 year old. The statistics clearly show that the entrenched diseases have a detrimental effect on the country's economy. The diseases include

malaria, bilharzia, skin ailments, night blindness, and a number of infectious eye diseases leading to blindness. Further analysis reveals the following:

--Malaria is the most widespread and entrenched disease in all parts of Sudan, except for the northern region of the Red Sea Province. On the average, 20 percent of the population suffers from malaria. The rate is even higher in agricultural areas, particularly the ones under irrigation.

--Bilharzia is widespread in al-Gazira and Blue Nile provinces. The high rate of incidence of this disease in Khartoum is attributable to the fact that the city is amply provided with health facilities where the disease is diagnosed and reported.

--Skin diseases are widespread in the eastern part of Sudan, and are related to poor nutrition. Most casualties are children under 5.

--Eye diseases are among the 10 most common diseases afflicting Sudan's population. Although preventable, these diseases often lead to partial blindness. That these ailments are preventable has been demonstrated by the campaign to combat trachoma and infectious eye ailments. The campaign has reduced the incidence of these diseases by 87.5 percent. The rate of blindness has been reduced from 4.46 to 1.09 percent of those afflicted with eye ailments, a drop of 75 percent. Despite these dramatic results, eye diseases had not been a priority target of former health care programs.

According to the working paper presented to the conference by the deputy health minister, Sudan's effort to realize good health for its citizens began in 1975 with the adoption of a primary health care program and similar projects including the Blue Nile program, the universal vaccination project, the antimalaria and antitrachoma campaigns. All of these projects have made good progress since 1975. They will also form the backbone of the new, comprehensive health care program. It must also be noted that much has been done to provide clean drinking water and a healthier environment. The present health development plan will end during the 1983 fiscal year, 30 June 1984.

The Ministry of Health normally prepares 5-year plans in conformance to the time intervals established by the national, social and economic development program. The goal of good health for everyone by 1980 is expected to be realized in stages varying in length from 5 to 7 years. Based on this and cyclical budgetary considerations, it seems more appropriate to begin implementing the program fiscally in 1984-85. It is not possible, however, to predict when preparations for the 6-year plan will be completed. This uncertainty is attributable to the fact that the early stages of the preparation require public participation, a task requiring much time and effort. The time element is further complicated due to the fact that many components of the Ministry of Health as well as other ministries are involved. The earliest target date is the end of 1980 or the beginning of 1981. Help from the World Health Organization will no doubt make this task easier.

It is quite important to explain the basic factors on which the success of the plan hinges. These include the response of the public--a factor related to

education--economic and social indicators, and the extent of the diseases [described earlier] in various parts of the country. The constitution of Sudan explicitly states that every citizen has a fundamental right to good health. By this is meant every citizen has a right to a measure of good health enabling him to live a productive, social and economic life. This goal of good health for everyone shall remain unchanged so long as we possess and use properly our human and financial resources. It must be noted that the government has been laboring to make this right a reality by its effort to improve the economic and social standards of living, particularly in the rural areas. This right is at the heart of the political philosophy which equates development with good health.

It is evident that good health is subject to several factors and that it cannot be maintained by providing health services alone. The state of public health in Sudan is marked by a high infant mortality rate and a short average life expectancy. In large measure this is due to entrenched and infectious diseases which hit hard at infants and young children. Another fact of life in Sudan is a high rate of miscarriages due to too many pregnancies and pregnancy related diseases, most of which are preventable. Much of this may be attributed to poor education, inadequate child care, poor nutrition and family planning. Poor nutrition is responsible for the high mortality rate and the spread of diseases among children.

An examination of Sudan's public health service system reveals some noteworthy facts:

1. Health services, equipment, personnel, finances, etc., are not evenly distributed. Most of the services and resources are concentrated in the urban areas despite the fact that the rural population accounts for 80 percent of the total population. Both the quality and quantity of the health services in the rural areas is inadequate. In addition to these inadequacies, the rural health service program is marked by poor organization and understanding of rural health problems and needs. Health employees at the intermediate level do not have clearly defined jobs. Support resources and supervision are inadequate or non-existent. Areas of jurisdiction serviced by health units are not clearly defined. The resources of the populations of these areas are not surveyed. In view of all this reform of the health service system is not a simple task, but it is being carried out by the executive branch of the government.

2. It has become evident that the state of health of Sudan's population is subject to influences beyond the control of the Ministry of Health. These include the availability of adequate water supplies, food and food distribution, public education, housing, transportation and others. Ministry of Health officials are convinced that the cooperation of other ministries is needed to solve these problems. The list of what they like to see happen includes the following:

1) Better communication;

2) Participation by the Ministry of Health in the formulation of plans by other ministries and vice versa;

3) Greater involvement of the public in health affairs, including the planning, implementation and reform stages of the health service system. Public involvement is one means of developing awareness and interest in health matters.

Deputy Health Minister Dr Shakir Mousa emphasized [in his address] that the goal of good health for everyone by the year 2000 can be realized by means of a better primary health care program and more efficient organization of the health service system. He is convinced that the reforms he described will insure success, awaken public interest in the nation's health system, and result in a better data gathering system and utilization of health resources. In particular, he believes that his recommendations would generate greater public support for reform, especially in the rural parts of the country.

One of the ultimate goals of the comprehensive health program under debate is to reduce the rate of infant mortality from 140 per 1,000 to less than 50 per 1,000. To accomplish this goal, the Ministry of Health will implement the policies outlined in its plan of action:

1. The government, being constitutionally responsible for the nation's health, will see to it that free primary health services are made available to all parts of the country.

2. Recognizing the value of self-help, the government will encourage local self-help health groups to take an effective role in the public health program. First aid groups are one example.

3. The government will seek outside aid and insure that such aid is utilized fully and in the best possible manner.

4. The government will see to it that the reform effort will not bog down but remain effective.

The government's first priority will be to insure the availability of health services to all people. This will be difficult in rural areas due to poor transportation and communication facilities. This task should not be too difficult in the urban areas where the major problem is the inadequacy of supplies and equipment.

The working paper [submitted to the conference] gives priority to preventive health measures. These include:

1. Providing adequate and clean drinking water supplies to the rural areas;

2. Improving the environment;

3. Giving importance to child and mother care;

4. Launching programs to combat entrenched and infectious diseases in the industrial and economically productive parts of the country;

5. Instituting health education programs, with attention to nutrition and school immunization campaigns.

Other priorities include better organization and more effective administration of the health service system. A special effort will be made to increase the number of public health workers, particularly in the wake of the decision to decentralize the public health service system. The contemplated improvements are designed to increase coordination and upgrade the level of services particularly in the remote rural areas.

The public must become involved effectively in the planning, organization and implementation of these health measures. Health service units under local municipal councils must receive adequate budgetary support.

It is also evident that the training programs of health service workers must be reviewed and upgraded and their exact functions defined more clearly. Training must become an ongoing activity.

Every province has an administrative assistant for health affairs. According to the public health service laws he is responsible for:

1. Planning and coordinating with the central authorities at the Ministry of Health;

2. Supervising of all health units in his jurisdiction;

3. Implementing the provisions of the 1975 public health law;

4. Implementing the 1963 law governing pharmacies and toxic materials;

5. Implementing the 1975-1978 Medical Council law;

6. Implementing the 1975 School Health law;

7. Implementing the 1975 Child and Mother (care) law.

By virtue of his position, the administrative assistant is a member of a number of committees of the local people's executive council. In addition to his responsibilities to the governor and the people's executive council, he is responsible to the Ministry of Health.

It is recommended that each administrative assistant for health affairs have three deputies, one to oversee medical treatment programs, one to oversee preventive medicine programs, and one to supervise social medicine. It is also recommended that the assistant for health affairs be of the highest caliber. His responsibilities are varied and include planning, fiscal management, public relations, school health programs, child and mother care, family planning, immunization, combating entrenched and infectious diseases, water supplies, nutrition, the environment, data gathering, medical fees, pharmacies and toxic materials, medical supplies and equipment, research programs and training.

[There is an abrupt break in the text here.]

Data on medical facilities in the provinces.

1. One 400-600 bed treatment facility
2. One social medicine unit
3. One unit for the treatment of infectious and indigenous diseases including malaria
4. Bilharzia [unit]
5. One unit for preventive medicine and [cleaning] the environment
6. A section for training doctor assistants, visiting nurses, surgical nurses, etc.
7. One school health unit
8. One health education unit

Each province has a main medical facility including all or most of these units. Some provinces might require new units. New units may be created. For this reason, it is not easy at this time to predict in detail the needs of each province. Furthermore, the preparation of an action plan for each province must await the results of studies, statistics and other needed information. Also, health problems differ from province to province, and often in different parts of the same province. Thus detailed studies are needed before the needs of each province can be assessed definitively.

It is recommended that each province's health services development committee consist of the following:

1. The assistant to the governor for health affairs, who will serve as chairman
2. The assistant to the governor for agricultural affairs
3. The assistant to the governor for education
4. The assistant to the governor for water supplies
5. The assistant to the governor for construction and public works
6. The assistant to the governor for fiscal affairs
7. Three to five members to be selected from the province's health board
8. The deputy assistant to the governor for rural health affairs
9. The directors of the province's rural and urban hospitals

The duties of this committee shall include:

1. Developing and upgrading of public health services
2. Coordinating services with the ministries and other groups
3. Insuring that preventive and social medical services are adequately provided to the citizenry
4. Insuring that the public is actively involved in the planning, implementation and distribution of health services

On 1 April 1981, Sudan will be redistricted into 6 regions:

1. The southern region, consisting of 6 provinces;
2. The central eastern region, consisting of 3 provinces;
3. The eastern region, consisting of 2 provinces;
4. The northern region, consisting of 2 provinces;
5. The Kordofan region, consisting of 2 provinces;
6. The Darfur region, consisting of 2 provinces.

In most likelihood there will be a minister each for health, education, water, construction and public works, and youth affairs. Other ministers may be appointed for other social and religious affairs. When this is accomplished, the ministries will become truly complementary.

Based on this, the importance of preparing an action plan for each region and province becomes evident. Costs, budgets, the nature of the health problems facing each locality and its ability to contribute to the support of the health program are important matters to be taken into consideration for allocating central government funds.

The following table gives a summary of the available medical facilities and personnel and the corresponding numbers required by the "health for everyone by the year 2000" plan.

Item	Number available	Number needed
Medical Centers	100	650
Health Centers	200 capable of development	--
Clinics	700	6,500
Primary Health units	650	12,960

Officials in charge of medical treatment, particularly some hospital directors and professors of medicine, are very concerned that the projected health care program gives priority to preventive medicine. They note that the standard of actual medical treatment is poor and beset with problems requiring solution. Others demand that the environment receive greater attention. Still others argue that pediatric medicine should receive top priority. Another faction directed attention to the scarce resources of the country and the inadequacy of its health education programs.

We asked Dr Shakir Moussa what he thought of the conflicting opinions and whether they would be taken into consideration when the plan is finally formulated. He responded by saying that many of the opinions expressed at the conference serve to complement the many studies that preceded the conference. He pointed out that the controversy about the special emphasis given to preventive medicine was settled by informing the conferees that the ultimate purpose of the plan was to make all components of the health program complementary to each other, rather than to emphasize a particular component. He stressed that the plan as conceived will best serve the health care needs of the people by making services available to all, and by upgrading the standard of these services.

Dr Shakir Moussa summed up by informing us that the plan was positively received by all conferees.

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